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A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
CONTRIBUTES TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
Michele Gilman* 
 
 
This Article explores the United States Supreme Court’s role in 
furthering economic inequality. The Occupy Wall Street movement in 
2011 not only highlighted growing income and wealth inequality in the 
United States, but also pointed the blame at governmental policies that 
favor business interests and the wealthy due to their outsized influence 
on politicians. Numerous economists and political scientists agree with 
this thesis. However, in focusing ire on the political branches and big 
business, these critiques have largely overlooked the role of the judiciary 
in fostering economic inequality. The Court’s doctrine touches each of 
the major causes of economic inequality, which includes systemic 
failures of our educational system, a frayed social safety net, probusiness 
policies at the expense of consumers and employees, and the growing 
influence of money in politics. In each of these areas, the Court’s 
deference to legislative judgments is highly selective and driven by a 
class-blind view of the law that presumes that market-based results are 
natural, inevitable, and beneficial. For instance, the Court rejects 
government attempts to voluntarily desegregate schools, while deferring 
to laws that create unequal financing for poor school districts. The end 
result is that poor children receive subpar educations, dooming many of 
them to the bottom of the economic spectrum. Similarly, the Court 
overturned Congress’s attempt to rein in campaign financing, while 
upholding state voter identification laws that suppress the votes of the 
poor. These decisions distort the electoral process in favor of the wealthy. 
In short, the Court tends to defer to laws that create economic inequality, 
while striking down legislative attempts to level the playing field. While a 
popular conception of the Court is that it is designed to protect 
vulnerable minorities from majoritarian impulse, the Court, instead, is 
helping to protect a very powerful minority at the expense of the majority. 
This Article is one step toward understanding how law intertwines with 
politics and economics to create economic inequality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“You can have democracy in this country, or you can have great 
wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but you cannot have both.” 
Louis Brandeis, Supreme Court Justice1 
 
The Occupy Wall Street protests that ignited on September 17, 2011, and 
flared throughout the fall and winter of 2011 may have flickered out, but Occupy 
Wall Street (OWS) and its call for greater economic fairness had a lasting impact.2 
With its slogan of “We are the 99%,”3 OWS changed the national conversation 
about economic inequality. OWS shined a spotlight on the fact that the top 1% of 
households currently earns one-fifth of the nation’s income, 4 while owning over 
one-third of the nation’s wealth.5 Meanwhile, incomes for the other 99% are at 
their lowest point since 1997, and these Americans face less social mobility, rising 
unemployment, and job insecurity.6 Simultaneously, poverty rates have increased, 
and nearly one-third of all Americans have either fallen into poverty or live on 
earnings that classify them as low income.7 These sobering facts undermine our 
                                                     
1  MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 1 (2012) (quoting Justice Brandeis). 
2 See James Miller, Is Democracy Still in the Streets?, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 
173, 174 (Janet Byrne & Robin Wells eds., 2012). 
3 Stephen Gandel, The Leaders of a Leaderless Movement, in WHAT IS OCCUPY? 
INSIDE THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT 34, 35 (Time Home Entm’t, Inc. ed., 2011).  
4 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United 
States 3, 8 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-
2010.pdf (updated with 2009 and 2010 estimates) (updating the original version of 
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 
PATHWAYS MAG., Winter 2008, at 6–7). 
5 See Sylvia A. Allgretto, The State of Working America’s Wealth 2011: Through 
Volatility and Turmoil the Gap Widens 4 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 292, 2011), 
available at http://epi.3cdn.net/2a7ccb3e9e618f0bbc_3nm6idnax.pdf; Edward N. Wolff, 
Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-
Class Squeeze—an Update to 2007, at 11 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper 
No. 589, 2010), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf. 
6  See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
2–4 (2010) (describing impacts on the middle class); BENJAMIN I. PAGE & LAWRENCE R. 
JACOBS, CLASS WAR? 6 (2009) (noting that middle and lower income groups have faced 
wage losses and stagnation, while high-income earners have seen wage hikes); Rajan 
Reghuram, Inequality and Intemperate Policy, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, 
at 79, 80.  
7 The official poverty rate in 2011 was 15%. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2011, at 13 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf. 
Twenty-eight percent of the population fell into poverty for at least two months between 
2009 and 2010, although chronic spells of poverty lasting over twenty-four months were 
uncommon at 4.8%. Id. at 4. One-third of Americans had income below 200% of the 
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vision of America as a meritocracy, where people get what they deserve through 
hard work and initiative.  
The OWS movement contends that this widening economic gap results from a 
tainted political system in which the government hands out tax breaks, bail outs, 
and other financial advantages to banks, business enterprises, and the super rich 
due to their outsized influence on politicians.8 OWS echoes prominent economists 
and political scientists who assert that rising economic inequality is not solely the 
result of market forces, but also government policies. Yet, in focusing its ire on the 
political branches and big business, these critiques have largely overlooked the role 
of the judiciary in upholding laws and legal principles that foster inequality. After 
all, politicians pass laws, but courts uphold them. Accordingly, this Article 
examines the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting laws that impact economic 
inequality.  
Economists have identified at least four major factors contributing to the 
sharp rise in economic inequality since the 1980s, although there is disagreement 
about the weight and significance of these factors. First, our educational system is 
not producing students with the skills to succeed in a technologically based 
economy in which low-skill jobs have been replaced by computers or moved 
overseas due to globalization.9 Second, we have a frayed social safety net with 
limited redistribution to people at the bottom of the economic ladder.10 Third, our 
                                                     
poverty threshold, which is considered low income. Id. at 17–18. Many of these families 
are working; “in 2011, more than 7 in 10 low-income families and half of all poor families 
were working. They simply did not earn enough money to pay for basic living expenses.” 
BRANDON ROBERTS ET AL., LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES: THE GROWING ECONOMIC 
GAP 3 (2013), available at http://www.workingpoorfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
01/Winter-2012_2013-WPFP-Data-Brief.pdf. 
8 See Geoff Colvin, Are the Bankers to Blame?, in WHAT IS OCCUPY?, supra note 3, 
at 64, 64–65; Nouriel Roubini, Economic Insecurity and Inequality Breed Political 
Instability, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 150, 150–151. 
9  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at 13 (2011) [hereinafter CBO REPORT]; FRANK LEVY & 
RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE CREATING 
THE NEXT JOB MARKET 1, 1–2 (2004); David H. Autor et al., Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 90 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 300, 310 (2008); 
Inequality and Skills, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Jan. 25, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://www.igm 
chicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_0IAlhdDH2FoRDrm 
(noting that over 80% of economic experts agreed that technological change was a cause of 
economic inequality).  
10  See Timothy Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality and Poverty: The 
United States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. QUART. 955, 969 (2005) (arguing 
that one reason the United States has greater income inequality than other developed 
nations is a weaker income support system); see also Barbara Ehrenreich & John 
Ehrenreich, The Making of the American 99 Percent and the Collapse of the Middle Class, 
in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 300, 304 (explaining that the middle class is 
vulnerable to economic dislocation because the welfare safety net is so limited). 
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public policies favor business interests over consumers and employees.11 Fourth, 
these probusiness policies are shaped by the growing influence of money in 
politics and a corresponding disengagement from the political process by middle- 
and low-income citizens.12  
Suffice to say, there are hundreds of Supreme Court decisions that touch upon 
these political and economic trends, and given the wide array of substantive law 
that is implicated, not all of the cases follow the same narrative. Nevertheless, in 
each of these four areas, Court doctrine has reinforced economic inequality. 
Pulling back and taking a broad view of the Court’s rulings in these areas helps 
identify patterns in the Court’s decision making that might otherwise appear 
isolated. In brief, the Court’s deference to legislative judgments is highly selective 
and driven by a class-blind view of the law. Sometimes, the Court defers to 
government laws and policies that harm the economic interests of the 99%. Other 
times, the Court rejects legislative attempts to redistribute societal benefits, while 
presuming that market-based results are natural, inevitable, and beneficial. Either 
way, the outcome is bad for economic equality. For instance, the Court rejects 
government attempts to voluntarily desegregate schools, while deferring to laws 
that result in unequal financing for rich and poor school districts. The end result is 
that poor children receive subpar educations, dooming many of them to the bottom 
of the economic spectrum. Similarly, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to rein 
in campaign financing, while upholding state voter identification laws that 
suppress the votes of the poor. These decisions distort the electoral process in favor 
of the wealthy.  
While a popular conception of the Court is that it is designed to protect 
vulnerable minorities at the hands of majoritarian impulse, the Court, instead, is 
helping to protect a very powerful minority at the expense of the majority. This 
Article is one step toward understanding how law intertwines with politics and 
economics to create economic inequality. Part I describes the rise of economic 
inequality since the 1970s and identifies the main causes for this divergence, each 
of which is linked to governmental policies. Part II analyzes how Supreme Court 
doctrine has reinforced economic inequality in the areas of education, 
redistribution, corporate law, and the political process. This Part examines the 
reasoning underlying the Court’s doctrine and reveals that the Court ignores the 
connection between government policies and inequality and defers to market-based 
outcomes as “natural” and desirable. Part III explores reasons why the Supreme 
Court maintains its class-blind view of the law in the face of economic reality to 
the contrary. It explains why the Justices, who are not subject to the corrupting 
influence of money in politics, nevertheless favor the interests of the 1%. Part III 
concludes by suggesting ways that progressive lawyers can work to reform law in 
order to create greater economic equality.  
 
                                                     
11 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 34–37 (2012) (discussing how 
policies are more favorable to business). 
12 See infra Parts II.B, II.D. 
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I.  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND OWS 
 
A.  The Rise of Economic Inequality 
 
We are living in an era of rising income inequality, driven by rapid growth in 
income among the top 1% of our income distribution.13 These Americans currently 
earn one-fifth of the nation’s income,14 or put differently, in one week, the top 1% 
earn more than the bottom one-fifth earn in a year.15 Income is superconcentrated 
at the pinnacle of the scale, where “the top [0.1%] received in a day and a half 
about what the bottom 90[%] received in a year.”16 Meanwhile, wages for most 
Americans have stagnated. 17  While the top 1% saw their after-tax household 
income grow by 275% between 1979 and 2007, the middle of the income 
distribution had only a 40% increase, and the bottom 20% had an abysmal 18% 
increase.18 Even as the country slowly emerges from the 2007 recession and its 
aftereffects, the top 1% is outpacing everyone else; they have amassed 93% of the 
income gains between 2009 and 2010.19 Wealth inequality is even starker.20 The 
top 1% own “more than a third of the nation’s wealth”21 or “225 times the wealth 
of the typical American,” a ratio that is double what it was in both 1962 and 
1983.22  
                                                     
13 See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at xi (providing statistics to show that income rose 
much more for households at the higher end of the income scale than those in the middle 
and lower end of the income scale). 
14 See TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 147 (2012); STIGLITZ, supra note 11, 
at 2; see also Saez, supra note 4, at 3.  
15 See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4. There are “two core facts” at play, according to 
James K. Galbraith, “rapidly growing pay in a few small high-paid sectors, and growing 
employment in a few large but low-paid sectors.” James K. Galbraith, INEQUALITY AND 
INSTABILITY: A STUDY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY JUST BEFORE THE GREAT CRISIS 135 
(2012). 
16 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 3 
(noting that the top .1% “received over 20[%] of all after-tax income gains between 1979 
and 2005, compared with the 13.5[%] enjoyed by the bottom 60[%] of households”).  
17 See PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 6 (describing the wages of low- and middle-
wage earners as falling or stagnating). 
18 CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at ix.  
19 Saez, supra note 4, at 1. Income inequality grew between 2010 and 2011, which is 
the first annual increase since 1993. DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 7, at 10. 
20 On the significance of wealth inequality and how it differs from income inequality, 
see generally James B. Davies, Wealth and Economic Inequality, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 127, 127–49 (Wiemer Salverda et al. eds., 2009). 
21 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 2. 
22 Id. at 2, 8; see also PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7–9 (describing the gap 
between the top 1% and the bottom 90%). 
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In short, the inequality gap has grown since 1975 to levels not seen since the 
Roaring Twenties.23 By contrast, during the thirty years that followed World War 
II, “America grew together,”24 and income distributions were stable,25 largely as a 
result of government policies such as the GI bill, which sent veterans to college, a 
progressive tax system,26 and a strong labor movement.27 Thirty years ago, the top 
1% earned 12% of the nation’s income.28 Today, it is 21%.29  
 
B.  The Causes of Economic Inequality 
 
OWS contends that this rising economic inequality results from government 
policies that aid the super wealthy and businesses due to the outsized influence of 
money in the political process. 30  There is ample social science and economic 
research to support this thesis.31 Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz 
argues that inequality is not solely the result of market forces; rather, “government 
policies have been central to the creation of inequality in the United States.”32 
Economist Rebecca Blank concurs, noting that “the political system shapes 
economic outcomes.” 33  Political scientist Larry Bartels similarly states that 
“politics . . . profoundly shapes economics,”34 and overlooking this connection 
“discourages systematic critical scrutiny of” inequality.35 Political scientists Jacob 
                                                     
23 PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7; see also Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality 
and Institutions in 20th Century America 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13106, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13106.pdf?new_windo 
w=1 (describing the increase in income inequality from 1980 to 2005). 
24 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; see also LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 
8–9 (2008) (“the real incomes of working poor families . . . and affluent families . . . both 
grew by the same 98%” from the late 1940s through the early 1970s). 
25  See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (describing the income concentration 
following World War II as unchanged). 
26 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 5. 
27 NOAH, supra note 14, at 21. 
28 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4. 
29 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7. 
30 See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers, 
Muckrakers, Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100, 110 
(explaining that OWS protesters recognize that the wealthy have control over political 
agendas and policies); see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, Occupy Global Capitalism, in THE 
OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 462, 473 (summarizing the demands of the 
movement).  
31 See NOAH, supra note 14, at 6–7 (describing the body of academic work studying 
the rise in income inequality). 
32 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 6.  
33 REBECCA BLANK, CHANGING INEQUALITY 12 (2011) (Blank is currently the acting 
Secretary of Commerce.). 
34 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 2. 
35 Id. at 29–30. 
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Hacker and Paul Pierson affirm this assessment, stating, “[g]overnment rules make 
the market, and they powerfully shape how, and in whose interests, it operates.”36 
A major factor driving inequality is the rise of pretax income for the top 1%,37 
due in part to government action and inaction with regard to labor laws, finance, 
and corporate compensation.38 As Stiglitz explains, government sets the rules of 
the game by establishing the playing field for unionization, corporate governance, 
and competition laws. 39 Union membership, which is correlated nationally and 
internationally to higher wages for the middle class, is only 12% of the total 
workforce, compared to 21% in 1979.40 Furthermore, the middle class is shrinking 
as better paying jobs disappear. Technology and globalization have reduced the 
number of moderate and low-skilled jobs, pushing those workers into the low-
paying service sector, while creating jobs for highly skilled, educated workers.41 
Yet, America is not producing enough college graduates to keep up with the 
change, and the government is doing little to hold down college tuitions that make 
higher education out of reach for many middle-class and lower-income families.42  
Moreover, the government has not reined in market failures that have led to 
excessive rent seeking by large corporations. 43  For instance, the federal gov-
ernment failed to regulate derivatives, banks then benefited from a lack of 
transparency in their sale, and the market was deprived of information and 
                                                     
36  HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 44; see also DAVID BRADY, RICH 
DEMOCRACIES, POOR PEOPLE: HOW POLITICS EXPLAIN POVERTY 6 (2009) (a sociologist 
explains that “the distribution of resources in states and markets is inherently political”). 
37 See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 (summarizing a study that computed Gini 
indexes using before-tax, after-tax measure of household cash); NOAH, supra note 14, at 
113 (noting the “stunning increase in pretax income share for the wealthiest Americans” 
not as a result of direct government redistribution, but indirect government intervention as 
a result of “institutions and norms”); PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 5–7 (comparing 
inequality in “take home pay” as one factor contributing to the remaking of the overall 
distribution of income). 
38 See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 65 (arguing that strong worker protections could 
correct an imbalance in economic power). 
39 Id. at 57–58. 
40 NOAH, supra note 14, at 127 (noting that union membership is now only 7% of the 
private sector workforce). 
41 Id. at 77; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 54. 
42 See NOAH, supra note 14, at 89; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 55–56; Alice Karekezi, 
What Caused the Wealth Gap?, SALON (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://www.salon.com/2
011/10/11/what_caused_the_wealth_gap (Jeffrey Sachs explaining that low social and 
economic mobility stems from the difficulty of obtaining an advanced degree, and thus a 
good position in the economy, if one’s parents do not have an advanced degree). 
43 See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 34, 39–51 (describing the financial sector as using 
“its political muscle to make sure that the market failures were not corrected”); Levy & 
Temin, supra note 23, at 6 (the impacts of technology and trade “are embedded in a larger 
institutional story” of post-1980 abandonment of prolabor institutions and deregulation). 
Stiglitz defines rent-seeking as “getting income not as a reward to creating wealth but by 
grabbing a larger share of the wealth than would otherwise have been produced without 
their effort.” STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 32; see also id. at 39–40. 
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appropriate regulation.44 Yet, what the government failed to do on the front end, it 
cleaned up on the back end. The political branches deregulated the financial 
industry, the market then collapsed,45 and the government stepped in to bail out the 
banks for their own misbehavior. In other words, “[t]he financial world was 
reaping the benefit of high-risk, largely unregulated trading while offloading its 
losses onto the government.” 46  These “bubble economies,” associated with 
massive gains to people at the top of leading sectors are unstable and “are no 
longer a plausible way to generate economic growth.”47 
Another high-profile example of corporate rent seeking is exorbitant CEO 
compensation; in 2010 the ratio of CEO compensation to that of a typical worker 
was 243 to 1.48 American CEOs earn two to three times more than their European 
counterparts. 49  Legislative efforts to rein in executive pay have been weak, 
impacted by corporate lobbying.50 Other forms of rent seeking that government has 
failed to restrain and that have contributed to economic inequality include 
monopolistic behaviors,51 predatory lending,52 government subsidies to business,53 
regulatory capture,54 and rules that protect companies from foreign competition.55 
Tax policy has also disproportionately benefitted the top 1%.56 President Reagan 
pushed the top tax bracket down from 70% to 28%, and it has stayed between 35% 
and 40% since then.57 The top 1% is not only earning bigger paychecks, but is also 
taxed less heavily than they were during the era of economic equality. 58 This 
economic inequality is neither inevitable nor natural; rather, government policies 
play a role in generating economic inequality.  
 
                                                     
44 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 35–36. 
45 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 67–86 (2011); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 68–70; NOAH, 
supra note 14, at 160–62. 
46 NOAH, supra note 14, at 186. 
47 GALBRAITH, supra note 15, at 148–49. 
48 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 3. 
49 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 62–63; NOAH, supra note 14, at 152. 
50 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 64–65, 221. 
51 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 43–47 
52 Id. at 36–37. 
53 Id. at 40; NOAH, supra note 14, at 172 (“Congress was busy extending copyright 
terms and patent monopolies and turning over public lands to mining and timber companies 
for below-market fees.”). 
54 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 47–48. 
55 Id. at 50. 
56 See id. at 71–74 (discussing how tax policies are less restrictive for the top). 
57 NOAH, supra note 14, at 110. 
58 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 48. On January 2, 2013, the President 
signed into law a tax increase to 39.6% from 35% on earners over $400,000. American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). This law was 
enacted to avoid the “fiscal cliff” and represents the success of the President’s rhetoric 
about income inequality. 
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C.  The Impacts of Economic Inequality 
 
While conservatives and liberals largely agree that income inequality is on the 
rise,59 they disagree over whether this is a bad thing. Liberals recognize that some 
level of economic inequality is an integral part of capitalism but contend that 
current levels of inequality—significantly higher than in other advanced, 
industrialized, democratic nations—are too extreme. 60  By contrast, for con-
servatives, inequality is a necessary motivator for citizens to work hard, innovate, 
and create wealth.61 Yet, we are at the point at which the level of inequality is 
more than what is needed to maximize output.62 For most middle-income and low-
wage jobs in our economy, effort and skill do not matter; workers are instead 
motivated by fear of losing their jobs and becoming destitute.63  
In fact, higher American worker productivity has not led to wage gains for the 
middle class; only the top 10% saw their incomes benefit from increases in worker 
productivity. 64  It does not appear that the megarich need additional pay as 
                                                     
59 PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 9–10 (“The basic facts about economic inequality 
are rock solid. The statistics have been meticulously gathered and analyzed by nonpartisan 
economists, respected government agencies, and independent bodies that work closely with 
Wall Street firms and private bankers and investors.”); see also NOAH, supra note 14, at 7 
(remarking on the consensus among experts). 
60 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 38–40 (demonstrating that the United 
States is now the most unequal nation of the advanced industrial countries in terms of the 
level and increase of inequality); NOAH, supra note 14, at 3–4, 164–66 (finding that the 
United States’ income distribution places it twenty-seventh of thirty OECD nations); 
Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United 
States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 955, 956 (2005) (determining that “the 
United States has the highest overall level of inequality of any rich OECD nation in the 
mid-1990s”). On comparative income inequality in developed nations, see generally 
Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality in Richer and OECD 
Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 20, at 71. 
61 See NOAH, supra note 14, at 165–68 (summarizing the views of economists who 
endorse this view); STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 106–17 (arguing that the conservatives 
believe that inequality motivates people to be more productive and efficient for a better 
outcome); Richard B. Freeman, (Some) Inequality is Good for You, in THE NEW GILDED 
AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF OUR TIME 63, 64–68 (David B. Grusky & 
Tamar Kricheli-Katz eds., 2012) (including a list of economists’ arguments supporting 
income inequality).  
62 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 82 (arguing that “many of the ways in which top 
earners make their money in response to incentives are counterproductive”). 
63 See NOAH, supra note 14, at 166–67 (arguing that the middle- or low-income 
workers are not motivated by goods acquired through skill and effort); STIGLITZ, supra 
note 11, at 102–03 (discussing the anxieties faced by the middle of the population). 
64 NOAH, supra note 14, at 176; see also BARTELS, supra note 24, at 17–18 (citing 
economists’ concept of the “unprecedented dichotomy” between worker output and income 
growth as evidence of fairness problems in recent development in United States income 
distribution); Levy & Temin, supra note 23, at 2 (holding that between 1980 and 2005, 
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motivation to work hard, and moreover, many executive payment methods are 
economically inefficient, such as stock options that raise executive pay regardless 
of performance.65 For instance, while amassing huge fortunes prior to the 2008 
economic downturn (largely in the financial industry and as corporate executives), 
the top .1% arguably was not contributing to society’s bottom line through 
technological, scientific, or other innovations that improve life for others.66 Rather, 
in the realm of finance, “it was not contribution to society that determined relative 
pay, but something else: bankers received large rewards, though their contribution 
to society—and even to their firms—had been negative.”67 In short, inequality is 
not providing the right kind of incentives, and it is skewing the market towards the 
top. 
Economic inequality injures the economy through “lower productivity, lower 
efficiency, lower growth, [and] more instability,”68 as the top 1% gain a larger 
slice of the pie without increasing the size of the pie. By contrast, across nations, 
economic equality is associated with longer and more sustained growth.69 Income 
inequality played a role in the 2008 collapse of the market, as middle-class 
Americans relied on debt to stay afloat.70 Large gaps between the rich and the poor 
are also associated with a wide array of social dysfunctions, such as higher rates of 
infant mortality and crime, less educational attainment, and lower life 
                                                     
business sector productivity increased by 67.4%, yet median weekly earnings of full-time 
workers rose only 14%). 
65 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 82–83 (“[M]any of the ways in which top earners 
make their money in response to incentives are counterproductive . . . .”).  
66 See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at xiv–xv (arguing that the wealth of the elite and 
wealthy seemed to arise out of their ability to take advantage of others).  
67 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at xv; see also John Cassidy, What Good is Wall Street? in 
THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 54, 72 (reviewing studies showing that “people 
in the financial sector are overpaid”). 
68 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 117. 
69 See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS 
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 302–34 (2012); BARTELS, supra note 24, at 14 
(“[E]conomists who have studied the relationship between inequality and economic growth 
have found little evidence that large disparities in income and wealth promote growth.”); 
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers, Muckrakers, 
Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100, 107 (“Countries that have 
succeeded in creating egalitarian, economically dynamic societies have done so because 
they have forged inclusive political institutions.”); Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, 
Equality and Efficiency: Is There a Trade-off Between the Two or Do They Go Hand in 
Hand?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2011, at 13–14; Jonas Pontusson, Inequality and Economic 
Growth in Comparative Perspective, in THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY 
DEBATES OF OUR TIME, supra note 61, at 88, 96.  
70 See NOAH, supra note 14, at 168–70 (citing scholars who support this point of 
view); Berg & Ostry, supra note 69, at 13 (explaining how inequality played a role in the 
United States financial crisis). 
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expectancy.71 In turn, these social ills result in lost productivity and increased costs 
“associated with containing the violence, healing the sick, and fixing the 
dysfunction.” 72  In addition, inequality undermines America’s self-identity and 
moral purpose, which are based on ideals of fair play and equal opportunity for 
all. 73 Inequality leads to attacks on immigration and resistance to international 
trade, both of which might otherwise alleviate some inequality.74 Meanwhile, the 
wealthy become more isolated in gated communities and less willing to spend 
money on common needs, while public investments drop in things such as 
infrastructure, basic research, and education. 75  These underinvestments lead to 
greater inequality, creating a downward spiral, as faith in government erodes.  
Given the downsides of inequality, why have the legislative and executive 
branches enacted policies that favor the interests of business and the wealthy over 
the average American? There are multiple explanations, most of which converge 
on growing political polarization and the role of money in politics. The rise of 
political polarization and partisanship tracks the rise of income inequality. 76 
Republicans favor policies that foster inequality, and they have not only held 
control through much of this time period, but their dominance has also pushed 
Democrats rightward. 77  Nevertheless, the top 1% have done staggeringly well 
through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and neither party is 
immune to the need to raise money to obtain and stay in power. 78 Moreover, 
studies show that politicians of both parties are most responsive to affluent voters 
and ignore the opinions of citizens at the bottom of the income ladder.79 Through 
lobbying and campaign contributions, business interests and wealthy individuals 
                                                     
71 See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER 
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 81, 108–13, 134–37 (2009); Richard H. McAdams, 
Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 37 (2010) (“In sum, though the 
empirical connection between inequality and crime is not fully resolved and requires more 
study, there is significant evidence that it is real and substantial.”). 
72  Michael Shank, Tax Loophole Users, Companies with Negative Tax Rates, 
Exacerbating US Income Inequality, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://w 
ww.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/income-inequality-tax-loopholes_b_1092309.html. 
73 STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 117; see also PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 46; 
BLANK, supra note 33, at 5–6 (addressing the noneconomic impacts of inequality, such as 
decreases in voting rate and self-reported happiness). 
74 PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 45–46. 
75 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 14; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 93, 289; Greg J. Duncan 
& Richard J. Murnane, Introduction: The American Dream, Then and Now, in WHITHER 
OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 3, 3, 7–8 
(Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) [hereinafter WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?]; 
John Ferejohn, Rising Inequality and American Politics, in THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE 
CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF OUR TIME, supra note 61, at 115, 130. 
76 See Ferejohn, supra note 75, at 115, 124–25. 
77 See id. at 126–29. 
78 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 163–93 (describing the Democrats’ drift 
rightward as the party started courting business to raise money). 
79 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 5.  
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have been able to secure the policies described above, such as unlimited corporate 
compensation, government subsidies, and deregulation. Yet, when such policies 
and practices that contribute to economic inequality are challenged in the courts, 
the Supreme Court generally upholds them. Accordingly, the next Part places the 
Supreme Court within this narrative of the government’s role in creating and 
maintaining economic inequality. The judiciary is the missing piece of the 
inequality puzzle. 
 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
The major causes of economic inequality all intersect with law and, 
specifically, with Supreme Court doctrine. This Part traces how the Supreme Court 
has contributed to economic inequality by denying social or economic rights for 
people at the bottom of the income scale; favoring the interests of business over 
consumers and employees; refusing to recognize a constitutional right to education; 
and allowing money to drive the electoral system.  
 
A.  Redistribution and the Social Safety Net 
 
The Court adheres to three core principles when it directly confronts issues of 
class. First, the Constitution does not create or guarantee social or economic 
rights.80 Second, the poor are not a suspect class, and thus, discrimination on the 
basis of wealth does not warrant heightened review.81 Third, laws that impact the 
poor are a type of economic legislation subject to rational basis review.82 As a 
result of these interlocking principles, poor people generally must secure any 
governmental assistance through the political process, yet they often fare badly in 
the legislative realm due to their lack of political influence and a societal distaste 
for and distrust of the poor. “The more generous a welfare state, the more people 
are protected from the economic insecurity and instability of markets.” 83 
Unfortunately for the poor in America, our welfare state is less egalitarian than in 
other developed nations.84 As political scientists have shown, Congress is entirely 
unresponsive to the political preferences of the poor. As a result of the recent 
                                                     
80 See DeShaney v. Winnebego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 
(holding that there is no constitutional duty to protect children from their abusive parents 
after receiving reports of possible abuse). 
81 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–37 (1973) (holding 
that invoking strict scrutiny is inappropriate in a class action involving poor families). 
82 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–25 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 470–72 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–37 (1973); 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 
(1970).  
83 BRADY, supra note 36, at 166. The author continues, “The generosity of the welfare 
state is the dominant cause of how much poverty exists in affluent Western democracies.” 
Id. And, of course, the scope and scale of the welfare state is a matter of politics. 
84 Id. 
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recession, many formerly middle-class people are falling into poverty, and the 
poverty rate is about to surpass rates not seen since the 1960s. 85  The OWS 
movement argues that poverty is not inevitable; it cannot be blamed solely on 
personal failings; and it results from structural features of the economy that are 
reinforced or ignored by government policies. However, in the ideology of the 
Supreme Court, government is not responsible for creating poverty and, thus, bears 
no obligation to solve it.86  
 
1.  The Constitution Does Not Create Social and Economic Rights 
 
The core principle of the Court’s class doctrine is that the Constitution does 
not ensure any minimum level of entitlement or standard of living. No one is 
constitutionally entitled to food, housing, medical care, or education. 87  As the 
Court has stated, “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual.”88 In this view, the Constitution creates negative, rather than positive, 
rights, meaning that the Constitution protects against government interference of 
rights, but it does not create any affirmative obligations on the part of 
government.89 Consistent with these principles, the Court ruled in DeShaney v. 
Winnebego County Department of Social Services90 that the Constitution is not 
implicated when the state Department of Social Services turns a child over to an 
abusive father after repeated warnings of abuse, and the child is injured as a 
result.91 Nor is the Constitution violated, according to Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 92  when a police department fails to enforce a domestic violence 
protective order, thus leading to the murder of a woman’s three children by her 
                                                     
85 See, e.g., Hope Yen, 4 in 5 in USA Face Near-Poverty, No Work, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/28/americans-pov 
erty-no-work/2594203/ (reporting on an Associated Press survey data that “[t]he risks of 
poverty . . . have been increasing in recent decades . . . coinciding with widening income 
inequality.”). 
86 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (stating that the government 
does not create indigency); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate 
Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
109, 110–13 (2009) (describing the Court’s unwillingness to compel the government to 
improve the difficulties their actions create for the poor).  
87 Lindsay, 405 U.S. at 74 (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill.”). 
88 DeShaney v. Winnebego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).  
89 See generally Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 2271 (1990) (scrutinizing the “negative liberties” of the Constitution and the 
discussion of the undesirable consequences of such an approach in decision law). 
90 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
91 Id. at 197–200. 
92 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
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estranged husband. 93  Notably, both children in the child welfare system and 
domestic violence victims are disproportionately poor.94 In these cases, the Court 
views the provision of government services as a privilege, in which citizens must 
take what they can get. 
This narrative of the negative Constitution is widely accepted, but it is neither 
natural nor inevitable.95 To begin with, the idea that the Constitution does not 
create affirmative rights is not textually accurate. There are many provisions of the 
Constitution that secure affirmative rights, such as the right to a trial by jury or the 
right to equal protection, which requires the “federal government to protect its 
citizens in the face of the states’ failure to do so.”96 Moreover, the action versus 
inaction dichotomy is a false one.97 As the DeShaney and Gonzeles cases show, 
government can harm as much by inaction as by action, and this distinction “does 
not take into account government’s pervasive influence through regulatory action 
and inaction, its displacement of private remedies, and indeed, its monopoly over 
some avenues of relief.”98 While property and contract may look at first blush like 
private market rights, in reality, the government creates and protects those rights 
                                                     
93 Id. at 768. 
94 For a discussion of domestic violence victims, see Deborah M. Weissman, The 
Personal is Political—and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 
387, 415–17 (“[t]he consequences of deindustrialization . . . are . . . associated with 
increased domestic violence.”). For further discussion of socioeconomic status of children 
in the child welfare system, see Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: Insuring that Poor 
Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of Poverty, 102 W. 
VA. L. REV. 607, 618–19 (2000) (arguing that cuts in federal benefits to support poor 
families has an impact on the number of children adjudged neglected); Dorothy Roberts, 
The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 161, 163–64 (William C. 
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (considering the associations between poverty and 
child maltreatment); Kristen Shook Slack et al., Understanding the Risks of Child Neglect: 
An Exploration of Poverty and Parenting Characteristics, 9 CHILD MALTREATMENT 395, 
396–97 (2004) (analyzing different aspects of poverty and child neglect); see generally 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) 
(contending that child welfare policies address the disproportionate number of black 
children in the United States foster system by punishing their parents instead of tackling 
poverty’s roots). 
95  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212–13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question 
presented by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be 
read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with 
the choice, I would adopt a ‘sympathetic’ reading, one which comports with dictates of 
fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province 
of judging.”). 
96 Bandes, supra note 89, at 2313; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American 
Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) 
(considering various amendments that require an obligation on government).  
97 See Bandes, supra note 89, at 2280 (arguing that the difference between action and 
inaction is superficial because to “act” is hard to define). 
98 Id. at 2283 (footnote omitted).  
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by providing enforcement mechanisms.99 Thus, a governmental decision not to act 
equals ratification of political choices. 
Unlike the United States, the constitutions of many other countries guarantee 
social and economic rights.100 While critics charge that such rights are impossible 
and inappropriate for the judiciary to enforce,101 there are examples where courts 
have held such rights justiciable. For instance, in South Africa, the country’s 
highest court ruled that the government is obliged to take reasonable measures 
within its available resources to achieve progressive realization of the right to 
housing.102 This decision preserved an important role for the judiciary in protecting 
vulnerable populations, while respecting the policymaking role of the political 
branches. 
Our own history reveals a greater commitment to social and economic rights 
than prevailing doctrine admits.103 In the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, there was 
a vibrant welfare rights movement and a receptive Court that appeared poised to 
recognize social and economic rights.104 The groundwork was laid in a series of 
cases in which the Court ruled that indigence would not limit access to judicial or 
electoral processes, which are fundamental aspects of citizenship.105 The Court has 
also ruled that states cannot limit welfare benefits to new residents without 
violating a constitutional right to travel, and it reaffirmed this principle postwelfare 
reform.106 While these right-to-travel cases are a rare win for the poor, it is notable 
                                                     
99 Sunstein, supra note 96, at 6; see also Bandes, supra note 88, at 2239.  
100 David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 
193–96 (2012); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 15–16.  
101 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 96, at 15–16 (arguing that social rights would be 
unenforceable); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 
TEXAS L. REV. 1895, 1895–97 (2004) (summarizing the argument that social welfare rights 
are unenforceable). 
102 Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), at 19 
para. 21 (S. Afr.). 
103 See William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique, and 
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1827–35 (2001) (summarizing the “social 
citizenship tradition” in America). 
104 See id. at 1858–67 (describing the goal to eliminate the categorical nature of the 
welfare system in the 1960s and 1970s); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 20–21 (providing 
examples of cases decided by the Supreme Court that recognize social and economic 
rights). 
105 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that 
the state must provide the vote free of charge); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) 
(holding that the state must provide counsel to poor people on their first appeal of a 
criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the state must 
provide trial transcripts to poor people appealing their criminal convictions); see also 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that the state may not condition appeals 
from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent’s ability to pay 
record preparation fees). 
106 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999) (affirming this right in the 1990s).  
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that these cases are premised on a view of welfare as a market that should remain 
unfettered so that the poor can strike their best deal for survival.  
The highwater mark of constitutional protection for the poor came in the case 
of Goldberg v. Kelly,107 in which the Court held that welfare benefits were a form 
of property entitled to due process protections.108 Justice Brennan addressed the 
importance of welfare benefits, stating, “[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demands 
of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities 
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the 
community.”109 Yet, the promise of due process often fails claimants who usually 
lack lawyers to argue appeals, struggle to get to hearings, and cannot take off work 
to fight for their benefits. Nevertheless, the Goldberg opinion was vitally important 
in recognizing that public assistance “is not mere charity,” but a means for 
furthering democratic norms.110 However, the momentum built by these welfare 
rights cases came to a screeching halt when President Nixon appointed four 
conservative Justices in 1970.111 
 
2.  The Poor are Not a Suspect Class 
 
After 1970, the Court solidified its position that the poor are not a suspect 
class under the Equal Protection Clause, and thus, legislation that discriminates on 
the basis of wealth is reviewed under a lenient rational basis standard. A suspect 
class is a group of people who have an immutable trait, who suffer from a history 
of prejudice and stereotyping, and who lack a political voice.112 The Court has long 
recognized that race, national origin, alienage, and gender are suspect classes, and 
as a result, legislation that draws lines on these bases is assessed under a 
heightened level of scrutiny.113 By contrast, without ever fully explaining why, the 
                                                     
107 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
108 Id. at 262. 
109 Id. at 265. 
110 Id. 
111 See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 20–22. “[I]t does not seem to me too speculative to 
suggest that if Humphrey had been elected, social and economic rights, American-style 
would have become a part of American constitutional understandings.” Id. at 22.  
112  This framework was set forth in the famous footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene 
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438–47 (1985) (analyzing these factors with regard to the 
disabled); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (analyzing these 
factors with regard to the elderly); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973) 
(applying these factors with regard to women).  
113 Race and national origin classifications receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). Gender classifications are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), as are those regarding 
nonmarital children, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  
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Court has regularly assumed that the poor do not meet the test for a suspect 
class,114 and it hammered home that point in its abortion funding cases.115  
In Harris v. McRae, 116  the Court upheld Congress’s denial of Medicaid 
coverage for medically necessary abortions; the restriction was challenged as 
violating equal protection because Medicaid covered other medically necessary 
procedures. 117 The Court stated, “this Court has never held that financial need 
alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis,” 118 
explaining that “although government may not place obstacles in the path of a 
woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its 
own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.”119 In the Court’s view, an 
indigent woman has the same range of options as if Congress had chosen not to 
provide health care coverage at all.120 In dissent, Justice Brennan remarked that the 
government’s antiabortion policy may have resulted from majoritarian processes, 
but it was not foisted on rich and poor alike. Rather, “it imposes that viewpoint 
only upon that segment of our society which, because of its position of political 
powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights from the encroachments of 
state-mandated morality.”121  
The majority’s assertion that government plays no role in creating indigency 
is simply wrong, especially in light of the state’s role in tolerating gender 
discrimination in the labor market, which depresses women’s wages.122 The irony 
of the decision is the Court’s “failure to see that the inaccessibility of free 
abortions, combined with a legal system which does not require employers to grant 
maternity leaves, child-care leaves, or a flexible work schedule, creates the very 
indigency which prevents women from exercising the choice to have an 
                                                     
114 Julie Nice argues that this is still an open question, as the Supreme Court has never 
explained why the poor are not a suspect class. Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: 
Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic Default, 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 647 (2008). 
115 Bridgette Baldwin, In Supreme Judgment of the Poor: The Role of the United 
States Supreme Court in Welfare Law and Policy, 23 WIS. J. OF L. GEND. & SOC’Y 1, 3 
(2008) (“While the historical arch from the Civil Rights Era to the present normally 
presents a story of expanded liberties and freedoms to the socially disenfranchised, the lens 
of the Supreme Court welfare decisions narrates a much different story.”). 
116 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
117 Id. at 326. 
118 Id. at 323 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to 
pay the expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women even if it pays 
expenses incident to childbirth)). 
119 Id. at 316. 
120 Id. at 317–18. 
121 Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
122 See Judith Olans Brown et al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in 
Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 630 (1987). 
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abortion.”123 As a result of McRae, poor women may forgo necessities, such as 
food and rent, to pay for abortions or turn to illegal and unsafe methods of 
abortion.124 A scramble for funds often leads to a delayed abortion, which in turn, 
costs more and has higher health risks.125  
Even if we accept the Court’s test for identifying a suspect class (i.e., 
possessing an immutable trait, a history of prejudice and stereotyping, and lack of 
political voice), we know far more today about poverty than we did in the 1970s, 
and this research suggests that the poor share many of the criteria of a suspect class. 
For instance, while poverty is certainly not immutable, intergenerational mobility 
is far more limited than our meritocratic myth assumes, as well as lower than in 
other countries. “Four out of 10 children whose family is in the bottom fifth 
[incomes up to about $25,000] will end up there as adults. Only 6[%] of them will 
rise to the top fifth [incomes over $100,000].”126 In short, who your parents are 
largely determines what you will earn in the future. 127  At the same time, our 
                                                     
123 Id.; see also Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building 
Sexual and Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 15, 47 (1990–1991) 
(ignoring the state’s role in perpetuating poverty “permits the state to escape responsibility 
for the tragic conditions of people’s lives and allows it to blame the poor, who are largely 
women, for their hardship”). 
124 Abortions can cost between $450 in the first trimester to $1,500 and more later in 
the pregnancy. See Magda Schaler-Haynes et al., Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: 
Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based Insurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 323, 330 (2012) (discussing the approximate prices of an abortion). 
125 Id. at 229 (“Women who delay abortions into the second trimester of pregnancy 
are disproportionately people of color and more likely to be lower-income than those who 
obtain abortions in the first trimester.”); see also Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterick, 
The “Other” Within: Health Care Reform, Class, and the Politics of Reproduction, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 395 n.128 (2011–2012) (“In 2001 an abortion obtained at ten 
weeks gestation cost $370 on average, by fourteen weeks the cost was $650, and by twenty 
weeks it was $1,042) (citing Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding 
of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 15 
(2007)).  
126 Eduardo Porter, Inequality Undermines Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/business/economy/tolerance-for-income-gap-may-be-
ebbing-economic-scene.html?_r=0; see also NOAH, supra note 14, at 29 (“Only 6[%] of 
Americans born at the bottom of the heap . . . ever make it in adulthood to the top.”); 
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 18–19 (arguing that the chance of moving up in America is 
small). Due to the consequences of rising inequality, the “birth lottery” has a higher impact 
on mobility today than in past years. See generally Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States 
Still a Land of Opportunity?: Trends in Intergenerational Mobility Over 25 Years (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19844, 2014), available at http://ob 
s.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/mobility_geo.pdf. 
127 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 16 (“[T]he proportion of families in the top quintile of 
the income distribution who remained there a decade later also increased, while the 
proportion of families falling from the top quintile into the bottom quintile, or from the top 
two quintiles into the bottom two quintiles, declined.”); JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN 
AMERICA 3, 51 (2003); NOAH, supra note 14, at 29; see also Justin Wolfers, Is Higher 
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societal notions of race and gender are becoming more fluid and less categorical, 
as we recognize differing modes of self-identity and a larger spectrum of variation. 
For these reasons, immutability seems a weak peg on which to hang constitutional 
doctrine. 
As to the second factor, the poor suffer from a history of prejudice and 
stereotyping that is compounded by racial and gender biases. As poverty scholars 
have explained, the poor have historically been categorized as either deserving, 
meaning they cannot be blamed for their poverty, such as children, widows, and 
the disabled, or undeserving, meaning they should be self-sufficient, such as able-
bodied adults. 128  Public support is more generous for the former, stingy and 
stigmatizing for the latter. This demarcation was put in stark relief when welfare 
was reformed in 1996 from an open-ended entitlement program based on means-
tested criteria. The theoretical foundation of the current welfare program, called 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), is that individual choices 
cause poverty, in particular, the individual choices of African American residents 
of inner-city neighborhoods marked by concentrated poverty. Although African-
Americans only account for one-quarter of the poverty population,129 and although 
few welfare recipients have lifelong dependency on welfare, the dialogue and 
debate surrounding welfare reform centered on a culture of pathology among 
inner-city African Americans.130 The media and politicians picked up on these 
cultural explanations for poverty, and began demonizing the welfare queen, a term 
popularized by President Reagan, which referred to a “woman of color who 
manipulates and exploits the welfare system, scorns lasting or legalized 
relationships with men, and has a series of children out of wedlock in order to 
                                                     
Income Inequality Associated with Lower Intergenerational Mobility?, FREAKONOMICS: 
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://www.freakonomic 
s.com/2012/01/19/is-higher-income-inequality-associated-with-lower-intergenerational-mo 
bility/ (“It’s striking just how closely related inequality and [intergenerational] mobility 
are.”). 
128 See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON 
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 8 (1989) (discussing the “undeserving poor”); Joel F. 
Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”: The Interpretation of Entitlements, 
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 906 
(1990) (“[T]he heart of poverty policy centers on the question of who is excused from work. 
Those who are excused are the ‘deserving poor’; those who must work are the 
‘undeserving.’ Ultimately, this is a moral distinction.”); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of 
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1505 (1991) (“[This] 
distinction created a line running through the poor, putting the aged, infant, and disabled on 
one side of the line, and the able-bodied on the other side.”). 
129 JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 3 (2003). African-Americans do, however, 
suffer a poverty rate almost twice that of the national poverty rate. Id. at 81. 
130  For a conservative attack on welfare, see LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND 
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 104 (1986) (arguing work should 
be a condition of welfare) and CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (asserting 
welfare should be abolished).  
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continue her welfare eligibility.”131 The welfare queen became a frequent target 
during the racially tinged debates over welfare reform in the 1990s.132 During the 
debates on welfare reform, congresspersons referred to poor mothers on welfare as 
“breeding mules,” “alligators,” and “monkeys.”133 In the end, TANF imposed work 
requirements on welfare mothers, limited lifetime receipt of welfare benefits to 
five years, and permitted states to require welfare recipients to conform to various 
behavioral mandates and to promote marriage as a solution to poverty. TANF has 
pushed millions off of welfare, but the vast majority of former welfare recipients 
remain poor, either because they are working in low-wage jobs or have disengaged 
from the social welfare system entirely.134 
As the TANF history reveals, the poor lack a meaningful political voice, 
which goes to the third step of the suspect class test. A study by Martin Gilens 
showed a statistical correlation between the views of higher income Americans and 
policy outcomes. 135 While legislation reflects the preferences of higher income 
Americans, the preferences of the poor are completely ignored, and even the 
preferences of median Americans have no impact when their preferences diverge 
from the wealthy.136 Why do the wealthy fare better? Gilens hypothesizes that “the 
most obvious source of influence over politics that distinguishes high-income 
Americans is money and the willingness to donate to parties, candidates, and 
                                                     
131 Nina Perales, A “Tangle of Pathology”: Racial Myth and the New Jersey Family 
Development Act, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION 
OF MOTHERHOOD 250, 257–61 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); 
see also Joel Handler, Ending Welfare as We Know It—Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for 
Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 7 (1994) (“The image, often unspoken, is the 
ghetto ‘underclass’: unmarried, young black women with several children, who are long-
term dependents of the welfare system. . . .”). 
132 See, e.g., Louis Kushnik, Responding to Urban Crisis: Functions of White Racism, 
in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS 160 
(Louis Kushnick and James Jennings eds., 1999); Valerie Polakow, The Shredded Net: The 
End of Welfare as We Knew It, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, 
POWER, AND POLITICS 167, 170. For a detailed description of the racist underpinnings of 
the welfare system, see generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM 
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). 
133 For instance, House Ways and Means Chairman, Representative Clay Shaw, Jr., 
said, “It may be like hitting a mule with a two-by-four, but you’ve got to get their attention.” 
Kushnik, supra note 132, at 160; Polakow, supra note 132, at 170. 
134 Michele Gilman, The Welfare Queen Returns, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y. & 
L. 101, 102 (forthcoming 2014); see also SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, URBAN INST., WELFARE 
REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED IN FIFTEEN YEARS? 6 (2012), available at http://ww 
w.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412539-Welfare-Reform-What-Have-We-Learned-in-Fifteen-Y 
ears.pdf (describing the difficulties that current and former TANF recipients have 
maintaining consistently earning wages). 
135 Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 
778, 786, 792 (2005).  
136 Id. at 788. 
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interest organizations.” 137  Similarly, Larry Bartels’s influential analysis of the 
voting patterns of United States senators found that they were responsive to the 
ideological views of middle- and high-income constituents, but the views of “low 
income constituents had no discernible impact” on their voting behavior, 
regardless of the Senators’ party affiliation.138 The poor’s lack of influence is not 
due to lower voter turnout (60% for the poor versus 80% for high-income 
respondents) or lesser political knowledge or contacts. 139 Rather, “the data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that senators represented their campaign 
contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.”140  
At the same time, corporations and wealthy Americans have no limits on what 
they can spend on political campaigns, and they can afford expensive lobbyists to 
push for their interests. Professor Stephen Loffredo states that the Court has 
remained resolutely noninterventionist with regard to legislation impacting the 
poor by reflexively raising its fear of the “Lochner bogey” and “any backsliding 
toward the anti-democratic judicial adventurism of that era.”141 The result is that 
“[c]orporations and wealthy individuals may wield disproportionate power at the 
expense of the less affluent, but so long as the richest CEO and the most destitute 
homeless woman each cast only a single ballot, this version of democratic equality 
is satisfied.”142 In short, the assumption that the poor have equal access to the 
political process is incorrect; rather, the Court “has handed the elected branches a 
carte blanche to deal with a politically dispossessed minority.”143 By refusing to 
see the overlaps between recognized suspect classes and the poor, both in theory 
and in fact,144 the Supreme Court plays a role in entrenching inequality. 
 
3.  Class-based Distinctions Are Subject to Rational Basis Review 
 
The third tenet is that legislation that discriminates on class grounds is subject 
to rational basis review. Unlike strict scrutiny, this level of review “requires only 
that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate 
state purposes.”145 It is hard to imagine a wealth classification that would not meet 
                                                     
137 Id. at 793. 
138 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 260. 
139 Id. at 279–80. 
140 Id. at 280. 
141 Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1277, 1290–91 (1993). 
142 Id. at 1359. 
143 Id. at 1284. The Supreme Court does not consider the poor a suspect class for 
constitutional purposes and often views the poor’s motives as highly suspect. See, e.g., 
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318–26 (1971) (upholding home visits as a condition of 
receiving welfare because they serve a proper administrative purpose and are not an 
unwarranted invasion on personal privacy).  
144 See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 86, at 127–29 (explaining how race and 
class overlap and should receive similar scrutiny). 
145 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). 
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this lenient standard, and indeed, “the [Supreme] Court has not struck down a 
welfare classification on constitutional grounds in thirty-four years and 
counting.”146 Moreover, deference to economic policy means that even the most 
skewed tax rates cannot be challenged. The Court explained its rationale for 
imposing rational basis review on wealth classifications in Dandridge v. 
Williams,147 in which the Court upheld Maryland’s family cap welfare policy.148 
That is, a policy of capping welfare benefits regardless of the size of a family, 
thereby not meeting the state’s self-defined “standard of need” for larger 
families.149 The Court stated that, “[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a 
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the 
classifications made by its laws are imperfect.”150 The Court acknowledged the 
difference between regulations affecting business and industry and those that 
involve “the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings.”151 Yet, it 
could “find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.”152 In short, 
“the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by 
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.”153 This 
theme was echoed in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,154 
discussed below, where the Court stated, with regard to school financing, that “the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic 
pressures of those who elect them.” 155 This deference, however, is selectively 
applied, as the Court has not deferred to other laws that serve the 99%, such as 
laws creating voluntary desegregation plans, laws regulating campaign finance, 
and laws regulating consumer welfare.  
 
B.  Businesses and the Court 
 
In contrast to the poor, businesses have fared well before the Supreme Court 
in recent years. Numerous scholars have tracked the probusiness leanings of 
today’s Court. Further, a close examination of business cases reveals a class-
                                                     
146  Andrew M. Seigel, From Bad to Worse?: Some Early Speculation About the 
Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV. 851, 851 (2008). 
Deborah Malamud points out that if a legislature made clear its intent to protect class 
interests, “the more apparent would be the tension between the legislature’s class-based 
theory of economic inequality and the economic-individualist theory upon which the 
legislature’s freedom to act is predicated. This is hardly a prescription for clear and 
coordinated governmental thought and action.” Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based 
Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1859 (1996). 
147 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 473, 486. 
150 Id. at 485. 
151 Id. at 508. 
152 Id. at 485. 
153 Id. at 487. 
154 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
155 Id. at 59.  
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blindness that trivializes harm to consumers and employees, while being extremely 
solicitous to business motives. The Court sees the market as a natural system 
producing ideal outcomes, and thus, any challenges to market outcomes are seen as 
disruptive rather than corrective. 
 
1.  The Roberts Court 
 
In 2008 Jeffrey Rosen wrote in The New York Times Magazine that the 
Roberts Court was “exceptionally good for American business.”156 Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky similarly concluded that “the Roberts Court” is the most probusiness 
Supreme Court since the mid-1930s.” 157  Progressive interest groups, liberal 
politicians, and the media picked up this theme, spurring academic interest in the 
alleged probusiness bias of the Roberts Court.158 Studies confirm that business 
interests have indeed fared well under the Roberts Court.159 From the beginning of 
the Roberts Court through the 2010 term, the position taken by the litigation arm of 
the Chamber of Commerce, which both represents and files amicus briefs in favor 
of business interests, “prevailed in 65% of cases before the Roberts Court.”160 In 
the 2011 term, the Chamber had a near-perfect record.161 Moreover, the Roberts 
Court is more likely than its predecessors to grant certiorari to cases involving 
                                                     
156  See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM 
(Magazine), at 38, 39–40 (“[E]ver since John Roberts was appointed chief justice in 2005, 
the court has seemed only more receptive to business concerns.”). 
157 Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2007 Supreme Court Term, 25 
TOURO L. REV. 541, 545 (2009).  
158 See Sri Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, The Roberts Court, and the 
Solicitor General: Why the Supreme Court’s Recent Business Decisions May Not Reveal 
Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2009) (“This perception of the Roberts 
Court as an institution increasingly aligned with business interests is widely shared. Indeed, 
it is conventional media wisdom that, with the additions of Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Associate Justice Samuel Alito, the newly constituted Court has been ‘good for business.’”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
159  David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court?—Explaining the 
Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019, 
1019–20 (2009) (explaining that between 2006 and 2009, the party supported by the 
Chamber of Commerce prevailed in almost 70% of cases in which Chamber of Commerce 
was either a party or amicus before the Roberts Court). 
160 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., BIG WINS FOR BIG BUSINESS: THEMES 
AND STATISTICS IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 2010–2011 BUSINESS CASES 1 (2011), available 
at http://theusconstitution.org/think-tank/issue-brief/big-wins-big-business-themes-and-stat 
istics-supreme-courts-2010-2011-business (noting further that the Chamber’s position 
prevailed in 81% of cases in the 2009 term and 57% in the 2010 term, including “the term’s 
biggest cases”). 
161 See Tony Mauro, A Strong Supreme Court Term for Business, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 1, 
2012, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Lauren-Goldman-Supreme-Court-decisions/ (reporting 
that of the twenty-five business-related cases that the Court heard in the 2011 term, the 
business side won nineteen and lost three).  
2014] A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT 413 
business law issues, which constitute one-half to one-third of its shrinking 
docket.162  
Some commentators remark that these conclusions are overstated because 
some cases pit businesses against one another and the numbers may reflect the 
Chamber’s careful selection of cases rather than a Court bias.163 Professor Jonathan 
Adler concludes that the Roberts Court is probusiness “insofar as it is sympathetic 
to some basic business-oriented legal claims, it reads statutes narrowly, it resists 
finding implied causes of action, it has adopted a skeptical view of antitrust 
complaints, and it does not place its finger on the scales to assist non-business 
litigants.”164 Professor David Franklin identifies similar tendencies, finding that 
“businesses seem to fare especially well when they are defendants; even better 
when the justices appear to view the litigation in question as having broad 
regulatory goals as opposed to individualized remedial objectives; and better still 
when the justices view the litigation as lawyer-driven rather than party-driven.”165 
Overall, businesses have done particularly well in securing their positions in cases 
involving “preemption, punitive damages, arbitration, pleading standards, and 
employment discrimination.”166  
One defense of the Roberts Court is that it is not significantly more 
probusiness than its predecessors. Indeed, history shows a steady uptick in 
probusiness outcomes from 28% before the Warren Court to 48% before the 
Burger Court to 54% before the Rehnquist Court.167 Notably, the Rehnquist Court 
began hearing cases in 1987, paralleling the escalation in income inequality. 
Professor J. Mitchell Pickerill explains that the acceleration in probusiness 
outcomes under the Rehnquist Court resulted from the solidification of the New 
Right Regime under President Reagan, who was committed to an economic agenda 
that centered on deregulation, tax relief, and supply-side economics and who 
appointed jurists to the bench who shared his ideology.168 He concludes that the 
Roberts Court’s “pro-business decisions are best understood as the culmination of 
a long issue evolution during the New Right Regime.”169 President Clinton sought 
                                                     
162  Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A 
Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 946 (2009); see also Jeffrey Rosen, 
Keynote Address, Santa Clara Law Review Symposium: Big Business and the Roberts 
Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929, 934 (2009) (arguing that the claim that the Roberts 
Court is probusiness is hard to dispute). Business cases include antitrust, bankruptcy, tort 
law, federal preemption of state law, punitive damages, and employment law. See J. 
Mitchell Pickerill, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 
49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2009). 
163  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 162, at 946–47 (arguing that decision where a 
corporation prevails is not necessarily evidence of a probusiness orientation).  
164 Id. at 951. 
165 Franklin, supra note 159, at 1021. 
166 Id. at 1028–29. 
167 Pickerill, supra note 163, at 1072. 
168 See id. at 1084–85. 
169 Id. at 1099. 
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to blunt the Republican’s edge on business issues, and thus, he appointed Justices 
who were moderate on corporate issues, while generally progressive on civil rights 
and civil liberties issues.170 President Obama’s appointees appear to be from a 
similar mold. Overall, the Roberts Court has consolidated a probusiness tilt that 
began in the Reagan era.  
 
2.  Under the Surface 
 
Of course, counting outcomes and votes does not tell the whole story. As 
Professor Martha McCluskey has pointed out, in order to understand how class 
assumptions shape the law, “we must look under the surface . . . to examine the 
way in which unequal class privileges and penalties become folded into the 
background as natural and necessary to the public order. . . .”171 Demonstrating this 
approach, she unpacks the 2003 case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell. 172 In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a Utah Supreme 
Court decision upholding a punitive damage award of $145 million against State 
Farm. 173  The Utah Supreme Court found that State Farm had “repeatedly and 
deliberately deceived and cheated its customers” through a national scheme to 
meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims and that its “fraudulent 
practices were consistently directed to persons—poor racial or ethnic minorities, 
women, and elderly individuals—who State Farm believed would be less likely to 
object or take legal action.”174 Despite these findings, the Supreme Court held that 
the punitive damage award violated the corporation’s due process interests.175 
McCluskey takes on each of the Court’s rationales. First, the Court was 
concerned that giving juries too much discretion might lead them to award punitive 
damages based on arbitrary whims.176 Yet, as McCluskey argues, the Court has 
conversely upheld the norm of discretion for jurors considering the death penalty 
in ways that result in racial discrimination and for police in enforcing mandatory 
court orders of protection in domestic violence cases—in both situations, such 
discretion can and has led to a loss of life or liberty. 177  Second, the Court 
contended that corporations must have fair notice about the severity of penalties 
for wrongdoing so that they can shape their behavior accordingly.178 McCluskey 
counters that corporations are well positioned to take rational steps to prevent and 
mitigate the potential of any large punitive damages awards, especially insurance 
                                                     
170 Id. at 1064, 1088–90. 
171 Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State 
Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1057 (2008). 
172 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
173 Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148, 1172 (Utah 
2001), rev’d, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
174 Id. at 1148. 
175 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 412. 
176 Id. at 417–18 
177 McCluskey, supra note 171, at 1043–45. 
178 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 417. 
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companies, as they specialize in risk management.179 Third, the Court concluded 
that evidence of systemic wrongdoing was inappropriate in determining punitive 
damages. 180  McCluskey contends that this “individualizes and trivializes . . . 
corporate wrongdoing,” while disregarding the clash of collective economic 
interests between consumers and corporations as well as the systemic gain 
obtained by corporations against less powerful actors.181 She summarizes that in 
the Court’s view, “capital owners’ organized and collective gain at the expense of 
the non-wealthy is a fundamentally normal, natural, and just exercise of power, 
while organized efforts to protect competing economic interests of the non-wealthy 
are fundamentally unfair, not just debatable policy.”182  
This class-blind approach exists throughout the Court’s business law cases—
including a trio of controversial, 5-4 business law cases from the 2010–11 term. 
Whereas the State Farm decision refused to allow evidence of systemic 
wrongdoing in an individual case, the Court in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes183 
shut the door to systemic evidence even in a class action, ruling that a proposed 
class of over one million female Wal-Mart employees could not prove common 
claims necessary for class certification.184 In Wal-Mart, women employees alleged 
that the company’s discretionary pay and promotion policies had a discriminatory 
impact on female employees, pointing to statistics showing that women filled 70% 
of the hourly jobs in Wal-Mart stores, but constituted only 33% of management 
positions, and across the company, women were paid less than men.185  
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that Wal-Mart’s policy of 
granting discretion to supervisors over employment decisions was “a very common 
and presumptively reasonable way of doing business.”186 He assumed that “left to 
their own devices most managers in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral, 
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable 
disparity at all.”187 In this view, any disparity must arise from benign factors, such 
as women’s lack of qualifications. For Justice Scalia, “it is quite unbelievable that 
all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some 
common direction.”188 By contrast, this outcome was quite believable for Justice 
Ginsberg, who authored the dissent. As she explained, discriminatory, 
discretionary employment practices can result from unconscious biases as well as a 
corporate culture that reinforces gender stereotypes through meetings, managerial 
                                                     
179 McCluskey, supra note 171, at 1047–48. 
180 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 422–23. 
181 McCluskey, supra note 171, at 1053. 
182 Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original). 
183 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
184 Id. at 2547–48, 2553–61. 
185 Id. at 2562–63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing factual findings of the trial 
court). 
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transfers, and corporate monitoring.189 Whereas Justice Scalia assumed good faith 
on the part of the corporation and was incredulous at the stories of the plaintiffs, 
Justice Ginsberg did not view obvious gender disparities as innocent.190 Here, the 
Justices’ underlying assumptions about how the workplace really works shaped the 
outcome. 
Class-based claims also failed in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,191 in which 
consumers sued a cell phone company for fraud and false advertising after they 
were charged over $30 in sales tax under a contract offering a free phone.192 In a  
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not proceed by class 
action in court because their contract required arbitration and, further, that the 
Federal Arbitration Act bars class actions in arbitration as well.193 In so doing, the 
Court overturned California law that made it unconscionable for adhesion contracts 
to bar class-wide actions.194 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia’s sympathies 
were entirely with corporate defendants, who might face pressure to settle 
questionable claims due to the “‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions 
entail.”195 By contrast, Justice Breyer was less concerned with the “terror” facing 
corporations than the rights lost by consumers. He argued that agreements 
forbidding class actions “can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims 
rather than to litigate.”196 Indeed, “[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to 
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a 
$30.22 claim?”197 Given this dilemma, California law sought to protect consumers 
from adhesion contracts that insulate corporations from liability for their own 
frauds by “deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”198 However, the decision gives corporations the power to 
determine what protections to grant consumers, and the result may be a lack of any 
incentives for corporations to comply with consumer laws in the first place.199 This 
case is part of a larger effort by the Supreme Court to interpret the Federal 
Arbitration Act beyond its legislative intent and history to “render unenforceable 
legal guarantees such as workplace discrimination protections—or protections of 
any sort for individuals obliged to sign nonnegotiable contracts imposed by 
                                                     
189 Id. at 2563–64 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
190 Id. at 2555 (majority opinion), 2563–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
191 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
192 Id. at 1744. 
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194 Id. at 1746. 
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196 Id. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 1761 (2011). 
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199 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2011, at B3 (summarizing reaction to the decision). 
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businesses or other large organizations such as consumers, patients, nursing home 
residents, depositors, retirees, or investors.”200 
In another 5-4 decision, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 201 the Court held that a mutual fund investment advisor could not be 
liable for making false statements that were included in prospectuses filed by its 
separately incorporated mutual fund subsidiary.202 In that case, the mutual fund’s 
officers were all employees of the advisor arm, and the advisor entity drafted and 
reviewed the fund’s prospectus.203 Nevertheless, the Court held that only the party 
with ultimate authority over a statement can “make” the statement, not “[o]ne who 
prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another.”204 The dissent took a 
broader view, noting that “[e]very day, hosts of corporate officials make 
statements with content that more senior officials of the board of directors have 
‘ultimate authority’ to control. . . .” 205  The majority’s interpretation insulates 
managers from liability, “even when those managers perpetrate a fraud through an 
unknowing intermediary,” which may have been the situation at hand.206 Professor 
Jeffrey Gordon commented that the majority’s formalistic approach ignores how 
mutual funds are interrelated with advisory services in ways that spur “managing 
agents to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the ultimate 
beneficiaries.”207 Gordon asks, in an era when the financial system’s gatekeepers 
failed to prevent the meltdown of Wall Street, “[w]hy . . . shift responsibility and 
accountability from actual wrong-doers?”208  
These cases are part of an overall pattern in which, time and again, the 
Court’s majority gives the benefit of the doubt to businesses while remaining 
skeptical of employees, consumers, and investors who challenge corporate 
practices.209 The choice is not between treating businesses as perfectly innocent or 
wholly evil, as the majority seems to think. Rather, business enterprises are 
necessarily self-interested, and sometimes, this motivation is harmful to employees 
and consumers so as to require an outside check. The majority fails to 
                                                     
200  See Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National Government: Justice 
Stevens’s Stand Against Judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 769, 810 (2012). 
201 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
202 Id. at 2299. 
203 Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the relationship between the two 
corporate entities). 
204 Id. at 2302 (majority opinion). 
205 Id. at 2307 (Breyer J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 2312. 
207 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the 
Supreme Court Can “Make” a Tree, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (June 29, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-ca 
pital-group-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-“make”-a-tree/. 
208 Id.  
209  See generally Lazarus, supra note 200 (describing how the Supreme Court’s 
statutory interpretation is eviscerating progressive reforms in the areas of regulatory, safety 
net, and civil rights laws). 
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acknowledge the complex incentives, cultural cues, and accountability failures 
within businesses, instead assuming that the market will correct most problems. 
The fate of Wal-Mart employees, AT&T consumers, and mutual fund investors 
shows this is not the case.  
 
3.  Unions 
 
In contrast to the rise of corporate influence over politics, the economy, and 
the courts, the influence of unions has waned. In fact, the decline of organized 
labor is a major factor—at least one-fifth to one-third—in growing wage inequality, 
making it as significant as the stratification of pay by education.210 Private sector 
union membership has plunged from almost 25% of all workers in the 1970s to 
today’s 7%, while wage inequality shot up over 40% over this same time period.211 
The decline of unions impacts not only unionized workers, but also other workers, 
because unions have traditionally been the major interest group advocating on 
economic issues for the middle and lower classes, such as executive pay controls, 
pay equity, a higher minimum wage, and support for social welfare programs.212 
By contrast, advanced industrial nations with strong unions have seen less 
economic inequality.213 The decline of American unions starting in the 1970s is 
traceable to several factors, including the growth of jobs in fields outside 
“traditional union strongholds;” 214  intensified employer opposition; 215  congress-
ional defeats of prounion reforms spurred by increased corporate donations to 
Congress; 216  the appointment of Republican appointees to the National Labor 
Relations Board, which in turn issued decisions that limited union organizing;217 
and the defeat of the 1981 air controllers strike by President Reagan.218 These 
trends reinforce a norm of free competition rather than fair competition.219 The 
                                                     
210 Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514–32 (2011) (providing factual support to show 
declining union membership in the United States over a thirty-year period from 34% to 8% 
for men and from 16% to 6% for women); see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 
56–61 (discussing the collapse of American unions).  
211 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 56–57; Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, 
at 513 (noting that between 1973 and 2007, “wage inequality in the private sector increased 
by over 40[%].”). 
212 See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 514–18. 
213  See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 57–58 (noting that unions are 
fundamental “to offer an organizational counterweight to the power of those at the top”).  
214 Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 516. 
215 Id. 
216 Id.; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 127–32. 
217 Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 516. 
218 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 58–59, 186–87. 
219 Michael Wachter, The Rise and Decline of Unions, 30 REGULATION 23, 23, 28 
(2007). Contrast this trend to the rise of unionization in the New Deal, when policymakers 
“were in agreement that unregulated competitive forces were destructive and were the 
cause of the Great Depression.” Id. at 25.  
2014] A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT 419 
Supreme Court has not been a major player in driving these post-1970s trends 
because its interpretations of labor law after the New Deal had already greatly 
restricted the transformative potential of the National Labor Relations Act. 220 
Recent cases are consistent with this history. 
For instance, in 2012, the Court issued Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1000, 221  ruling against a union that charged non-
members a special fee to support political activity.222 Under California law, public 
sector employees can create an “agency shop” by deciding through majority vote 
to be represented by a union.223 In order to prevent free riding, nonmembers have 
to pay an annual fee for collective bargaining representation provided by the union, 
but due to First Amendment constraints, they can opt out of supporting the union’s 
political activities.224 In the summer of 2005, the Service Employees International 
Union (“SEIU”) was fighting several anti-union ballot initiatives, and it decided to 
issue a special assessment to generate additional union fees. 225  Several non-
members objected to having to support the SEIU’s political activities.226  
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Alito held the union should have 
required an opt-in for nonmembers, rather than relying on an opt-out procedure 
and that this failure violated the nonmembers’ First Amendment right against 
compelled support of private speech and created a “remarkable boon for 
unions.” 227 The majority’s approach purposefully limits unions’ ability to raise 
money for political activity. In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the 
nonmembers had the constitutional right not to financially support political speech, 
as this was settled law, but disagreed that the Constitution required an opt-in 
procedure for special assessments—an issue which the litigants did not request, 
argue, or brief. 228  In her words, the majority’s opinion went far beyond the 
question presented and, thus, “breaks our own rules and, more importantly, 
disregards principles of judicial restraint that define the Court’s proper role in our 
                                                     
220 Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and 
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) (discussing Court decisions 
in the early part of the twentieth century that perpetuated race discrimination, thereby 
limiting class solidarity by workers that could have strengthened workers’ rights). See 
generally Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of 
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (discussing the 
transformation of the labor movement); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War 
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (discussing “industrial 
pluralism” or self-government by management and labor). For a discussion of how law 
shaped the early American labor movement, see WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE 
SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). 
221 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
222 Id. at 2294–96. 
223 Id. at 2284. 
224 Id. at 2284–85. 
225 Id. at 2285–86. 
226 Id. at 2286. 
227 Id. at 2289–90. 
228 Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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system of separated powers.”229 Justice Breyer remarked in dissent that the Court’s 
decision lays the groundwork for mandatory opt-in procedures for regular union 
dues.230 Moreover, by constitutionalizing the opt-in procedure, the Court short-
circuited a political debate about union dues and right-to-work laws that is 
occurring across the states.231 Here, deference to legislative choices is missing. 
The outcome in Knox stands in stark contrast with Citizens United v. FEC,232 
discussed below, in which the Court held that corporate entities can spend their 
funds on political campaigns without concern for shareholder preferences.233 To be 
sure, Citizens United also permits unions to spend money on political campaigns, 
yet there is an asymmetry between the ability of corporations and unions to fund 
this activity. Corporations can spend their treasury funds without shareholder 
approval, while unions must get the consent of their members.234  
 
C.  Education 
 
In America, education is widely considered the springboard to financial 
security and an equalizer among social classes.235 Nevertheless, our educational 
system perpetuates a wide achievement gap between high income and poor 
students, who are disproportionately minority and more likely to attend segregated 
schools. 236 Currently, “[m]ore than 75% of predominately minority schools are 
                                                     
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. at 2306–07. 
232 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
233 Id. at 886. 
234  Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political Opt-Out Rights After 
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 803 (2012). 
235 See PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 58–59 (public opinion polls show that 
Americans support government spending on education); Duncan & Murnane, supra note 75, 
at 3–7 (“For many generations of Americans, education was the springboard to upward 
mobility.”). On the historic roots of this concept, see generally Blanche Brick, Changing 
Concepts of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Comparison of the Views of Thomas 
Jefferson, Horace Mann and John Dewey, 32 AM. EDUC. HIST. J. 166 (2005). 
236 See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich 
and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, 
supra note 75, at 91 (stating the achievement gap is “now nearly twice as large as the 
black-white achievement gap”); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Call for A New Theory of Education 
Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 (2012) (reviewing JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES 
AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (2010)); Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” 
Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 
1474 (2007) (“The ‘achievement gap’ results directly from the fact that high proportions of 
African-American and Latino students live in conditions of poverty and that by and large 
they attend segregated schools.”); Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich 
and Poor, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/edu 
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also high-poverty schools.”237 The concentration of poverty drives an achievement 
gap that is compounded by lower funding for poor schools, despite the more costly 
needs of their students.238 Compared to their more affluent peers, poor children 
attend schools with fewer quality teachers, less challenging curricula, lower rates 
of achievement, and lower graduation rates.239 Many poor children also arrive at 
school with the challenges of living in high-crime neighborhoods and coming from 
less stable families struggling with the stresses of poverty.240  
Not surprisingly, family background plays a large role in educational 
achievement, in part because wealthier families are able to invest more in their 
children through high-quality early childhood education, tutors, enrichment classes, 
                                                     
cation/education-gap-grows-between-rich-and-poor-studies-show.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0. 
237  Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation and the 
Importance of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 947, 
959 (2008).  
238 Id. at 957–58; Raegen T. Miller & Cynthia G. Brown, School Districts Give Low-
Income Schools Less Than a Fair Share of Funds, NBC NEWS EDUC. NATION, (Dec. 1, 
2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.educationnation.com/index.cfm?objectid=32551596-1C6F-11 
E1-8E80000C296BA163&aka=0; see also Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as 
Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 
409–10 (2012) (explaining that middle class students enhance the learning environment for 
all students). 
239 GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 21–22 (2004); see also Don 
Boyd et al., The Effect of School Neighborhoods on Teachers’ Career Decisions, in 
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 377, 377 (explaining that schools with large 
populations of poor children, on average, have more difficulty attracting high-quality 
teachers); Vilsa E. Curto et al., It May Not Take a Village: Increasing Achievement Among 
the Poor, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 483, 483, 486 (discussing poor 
students’ lower achievement); Black, supra note 237, at 959 (discussing low graduation 
rates of children at poor or minority schools). 
240  See David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Crime and the Production of Safe 
Schools, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 397, 398 (“[T]here is growing 
evidence that violence in and around primary and secondary schools is a major barrier to 
physical, emotional, and educational well-being.”); Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism 
and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice 
Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 647–48 (2011) (describing challenges poor 
children face in their home environments); MARGUERITE L. SPENCER & REBECCA RENO, 
KIRWAN INSTITUTE, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN OUR 
EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 11 (2009), 
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/spencer.pdf (“Students of color are not only 
compromised in the classroom, they endure cumulative home and neighborhood 
disadvantages, including the scarcity of high-quality early childhood education programs, 
poor housing stock, relative inaccessibility of healthcare, greater exposure to harmful 
environmental pollutants, and high crime levels.”). 
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private school tuition, and college.241 For all these reasons, poor children are less 
likely to attend college, which is the single strongest predictor of success in the 
workforce. 242  We all pay a price for educational inequality because without 
competent workers, America is less able to compete in the global economy.243 In 
short, educational inequality along race and class lines contributes to economic 
inequality, which in turn creates a vicious cycle that further entrenches the 
shortcomings of our educational system.244 The Supreme Court has enabled these 
disheartening trends by denying deference to legislative decisions to pursue 
desegregation plans, while deferring to legislative judgments that skew school 
financing toward wealthier districts.245 At the same time, the Court has refused to 
recognize a right to education, and its commitment to diversity in higher education 
is wavering. As one education law expert has summarized, “[w]hile the Court 
alone does not bear responsibility for the current pervasive presence of separate 
and unequal schools, the convergence of the Court’s actions in these cases has 
substantially contributed to the deeply entrenched nature of segregation and 
inequality in these schools.”246  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
241 Neeraj Kaushal et al., How is Family Income Related to Investments in Children’s 
Learning?, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 187, 187–205; Reardon, supra 
note 236, at 91, 105; Tavernise, supra note 236 (reporting on a forthcoming study by 
Sabino Kornrich and Frank F. Furstenburg that finds that in 1972, wealthy parents spent 
five times as much per child as low-income families, but that by 2007, the ratio was nine to 
one).  
242 Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Inequality in Postsecondary Education, in 
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 117, 117–18; Robert Haveman & Timothy 
Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility, 16 FUTURE CHILD. 125, 126 
(2006) (articulating that in 2000 the median income for college graduates was twice that of 
high school graduates); Robinson, supra note 236, at 427–28 (poor and minority children 
are not adequately prepared for college or work); Michal Kurlaender & Stella M. Flores, 
The Racial Transformation of Higher Education, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR 
LINE: COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 11, 11–13 (Gary Orfield, et 
al. eds., 2005) (discussing the racial gap in college participation rates for minorities and the 
poor).  
243 See Rebell, supra note 236, at 1475; see also Wilson, supra note 240, at 648–49 
(stating that the United States loses wage earning potential and tax revenues when minority 
children are not adequately educated). 
244 Duncan & Murnane, supra note 75, at 3, 8; see Stephen Machin, Education and 
Inequality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 20, at 406, 
406–31 (explaining how education is tied to wage inequality).  
245 See Robinson, supra note 236, at 443–44, 454. 
246 Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding 
and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. 
L. REV. 787, 837 (2010).  
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1.  Desegregation 
 
In Brown v. Board of Education,247 the Court struck down “separate but equal” 
schools and committed the nation to equal educational opportunity for all 
children. 248  For over a decade afterward, southern states aggressively resisted 
complying with Brown’s mandate,249 thus prompting the Court to issue several 
decisions in the mid-1960s striking down a variety of obstructionist tactics.250 In 
1971 the Court told the lower federal courts that they had the power to desegregate 
schools, including using busing as a remedy.251 In subsequent years, desegregation 
made a difference; up until the late 1980s, the percentage of students attending 
integrated schools continually increased, and by 1988 nearly half of all black 
students in the South attended majority white schools.252 To date, desegregation 
remains a proven method for improving the outcomes for poor, minority children, 
without harming the achievement of white students.253  
However, beginning in the 1970s, the Court put the brakes on desegregation. 
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 254 a 1973 decision, the Court distinguished 
between de jure and de facto segregation and held that only segregation taken with 
                                                     
247 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
248 Id. at 495. 
249 See Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 18, 21–30 (Nathaniel Persity et al. eds., 2008) (describing public reaction 
and responses in the South to Brown both immediately after and in years following Brown); 
Robinson, supra note 246, at 798–800 (describing the pressures on school board members, 
politicians, and judges to oppose desegregation). 
250 E.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (ordering Virginia 
school board to desegregate and rejecting race-neutral freedom of choice plan); Rogers v. 
Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199–200 (1965) (per curiam) (ordering Arkansas school district to 
permit black students to attend the high school of their choice); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 
377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (holding as unconstitutional a county school board decision 
to close all local public schools and provide vouchers to attend private schools). 
251 Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–32 (1971). 
252 Derek W. Black, Voluntary Desegregation, Resegregation, and the Hope for Equal 
Educational Opportunity, 38 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2011) (“Though it is not the story often told 
today, desegregation was very successful for a period of time. From the mid-1960s until the 
late 1980s, the percentage of students attending desegregated schools expanded each year.” 
(citing ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 239)). 
253 See Black, supra note 252, at 2 (“[D]esegregation is the only policy with a long 
and consistent track record of improving educational outcomes for disadvantaged 
students.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIV. RTS. PROJECT, HISTORIC 
REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION 
STRATEGIES 6, 11 (2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-edu 
cation/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need- 
for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf; SPENCER & 
RENO, supra note 240, at 13; Erika Frankenberg, School Integration: The Time is Now, in 
LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN 
SCHOOLS 7, 16 (Erika Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007). 
254 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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a discriminatory purpose violated the equal protection clause. 255  This made it 
nearly impossible to challenge racially isolated schools that resulted from 
residential segregation, even though housing patterns are rooted in governmental 
policies.256 A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley,257 the Court took a narrower view 
of its remedial authority and struck down a federal court order that imposed an 
interdistrict remedy on Detroit’s majority black schools and its surrounding 
predominantly white suburbs, making it difficult to desegregate urban schools.258 
By bowing to the politically powerful “suburban veto,” the Court reinforced 
inequality.259 
The Court stopped mandatory desegregation in its tracks with a series of 
decisions in the early 1990s that not only limited the authority of the federal 
district courts to order desegregation, but also encouraged them to dissolve existing 
decrees—even if the dissolution would result in a return to racially identifiable 
schools.260 The lower federal courts complied. As a result, our schools are now 
                                                     
255 Id. at 208–09, 213–14. The discriminatory purpose test has been widely criticized 
because it obscures the government’s role in reinforcing patterns of private discrimination. 
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 939, 975 (1989) (asserting “that the discriminatory intent standard is not a 
satisfactory comprehensive account of discrimination” because it is “vague and 
indeterminate”); Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The 
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 584 (1965) (asserting “that the labels ‘de 
facto segregation’ and ‘state action’ only obscure the issue of governmental 
responsibility”). 
256 See Black, supra note 237, at 950–51 (“Proving intentional discrimination or de 
jure segregation, however, can be difficult, particularly in northern school districts that 
never passed laws explicitly mandating segregation.”).  
257 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
258 Id. at 744–45; see, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 729 (3rd ed. 2006) (“There simply are not enough white students in the city, 
or enough black students in the suburbs, to achieve desegregation without an interdistrict 
remedy.”); Black, supra note 237, at 951–52 (“In addition, Milliken signaled to whites that 
they could avoid desegregation and build exclusive enclaves by simply moving across the 
school district line. In that respect, Milliken likely exacerbated segregation.”); Rachel F. 
Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation Cases, 63 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 475, 487 (2009) (“As a result, Milliken sounded the death knell for 
meaningful school integration in most cities outside the South.”); Robinson, supra note 236, 
at 434–35 (“The Milliken I decision dealt a crippling blow to desegregation efforts because 
most urban schoolchildren in northern and western cities were trapped within urban 
districts that lacked sufficient numbers of white students for meaningful desegregation 
given the substantial exodus of middle-class whites to the suburbs that occurred during the 
1960s and 1970s.”).  
259 James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1635, 1646 (2004) (noting that the Court gave suburban schools the “power to limit any 
education reform that would interfere with suburban autonomy”). 
260 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that salary increases for staff 
ordered as part of a desegregation remedy went beyond the authority of the court); Freeman 
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992) (holding that a federal trial court can release a school 
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segregated, mostly by district, at levels not found since 1970, when desegregation 
was just taking root.261 Now, the average white student attends a school that is 
83% white, while about one-third of black and Latino students attend schools that 
are 90% to 100% minority.262 In short, “with the help of the courts, middle-class 
whites successfully fought to preserve their schools for themselves by preventing 
integration—and the minority students that integration required—from entering 
their schoolhouse doors.”263 The Court’s doctrine shifted from equal education as a 
civil right to school choice as a civil right.264 
Even voluntary desegregation plans are under fire by the Court. In 2007 in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,265 the 
Court struck down voluntary desegregation plans undertaken by Louisville, 
Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington, that considered race in certain school 
assignments in order to ensure diverse schools. 266  The Court’s long-standing 
deference to local authorities since the 1970s is missing in this case. 267  The 
complicated opinion resulted in a 4-1-4 split among the Justices. The plurality 
opinion by Justice Roberts held that the only permissible use of race in school 
assignments is to remedy past, purposeful discrimination.268 As Justice Roberts 
stated, Seattle’s plan “is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal 
                                                     
board from active judicial oversight incrementally before the board’s district achieves full 
unitary status); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (ending a federal 
desegregation order).  
261 See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 253, at 5–7; Robinson, supra note 236, at 325; 
James E. Ryan, The Real Lessons of School Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 87 (Joshua M. Dunn & 
Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“The plain, somewhat shocking truth is that the majority of 
school districts—not schools, but districts, are either at least 90[%] white or 90[%] 
minority.”). 
262 Robinson, supra note 236, at 428. 
263 Id. at 440. 
264 See John Charles Boger, Standing at a Crossroads: The Future of Integrated 
Public Schooling in America, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: NEW 
POLICIES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR A MULTIRACIAL GENERATION 13, 18 (Erika 
Frankenberg & Elizabeth Debray eds., 2011).  
265 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
266 Id. 
267 See Ryan, supra note 261, at 89. 
268 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. Daniel Tokaji remarks that the case “overrules 
decisions of democratically elected school boards, made after years of trial-and-error 
experience in trying to integrate public schools. Yet missing from the majority Justices’ 
opinions is a persuasive justification for the federal judiciary’s substitution of its own 
judgment regarding the costs and benefits of race-conscious integration programs for those 
made by fairly elected local school boards.” Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, 
Discrimination and Democracy: Parents Involved’s Disregard for Process, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 847, 847 (2008). Rachel Moran critiques the decision, stating that “a majority of the 
Justices were so concerned with limiting remedies for past discrimination that they largely 
overlooked the problem of constraining a community’s capacity to imagine its racial 
future.” Moran, supra note 258, at 477. 
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discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.”269 By contrast, 
the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Breyer, concluded that the voluntary 
desegregation plans satisfied compelling state interests in diversity and avoiding 
racial isolation and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.270  
In his controlling opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that the 
government has a compelling state interest “in ensuring all people have equal 
opportunity regardless of their race.”271 However, he joined with the plurality in 
concluding that the plans at issue were not narrowly tailored to survive strict 
scrutiny because they classified students on the basis of race.272 Instead of racial 
classifications, Justice Kennedy suggested that school districts promoting diversity 
can survive by using race-neutral mechanisms, such as site selection of new 
schools, redrawn attendance zones, or even individualized evaluations that might 
include race as a factor, in accordance with the Grutter case, which permits the use 
of race along with other factors in law school admissions.273  
Importantly, the breakdown of votes reflects underlying assumptions about 
the causes of residential and educational segregation. In his plurality opinion, 
Justice Roberts stated, “The distinction between segregation by state action and 
racial imbalance caused by other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in 
this area for generations.” 274  In other words, for Justice Roberts, housing and 
school segregation result from “other factors” (i.e., private, natural, market forces 
outside the scope of government responsibility).  
By contrast, Justice Breyer explicated a long history of purposeful, 
governmental discrimination in the educational systems of Seattle and Louisville, 
as well as governmental policies that created residential segregation.275 He then 
linked both these patterns to the current barriers facing cities that want to provide 
diverse educational opportunities for their students. As he put it, “[t]he historical 
and factual context in which these cases arise is critical.”276 In light of this history, 
Justice Breyer claimed that the cities had an interest “in continuing to combat the 
remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by these school-related policies, 
which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, employment 
practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes.”277 In Justice Breyer’s view, 
government played a role in creating segregation, and thus, it should play a role in 
dismantling it. For his part, Justice Kennedy similarly acknowledged that “[d]ue to 
a variety of factors—some influenced by government, some not—neighborhoods 
in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole.”278 In 
                                                     
269 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 731. 
270 Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
271 Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
272 Id. at 787. 
273 Id. at 789–90. 
274 Id. at 736 (majority opinion). 
275 Id. at 804–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
276 Id. at 804. 
277 Id. at 838. 
278 Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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short, Justices who draw a stark line between de jure and de facto segregation 
without seeing the possible linkages between them do not support remedial efforts 
to desegregate schools.  
The majority’s refusal to acknowledge this connection appears either clueless 
or willfully blind to the government’s role in creating segregated housing patterns, 
which in turn, impacts school enrollment. 279  Professors Douglas Massey and 
Nancy Denton have explained in detail how federal governmental policies served 
to isolate and segregate urban, African-American communities from the rest of the 
urban and regional environment.280 In brief, the history is as follows. During the 
1930s and ‘40s, African-Americans were trapped as renters within inner cities 
when the federal government and private banks redlined minority neighborhoods 
and refused to provide African-Americans with mortgages, thus reducing a source 
of household wealth for generations.281 Meanwhile, the white middle class left the 
inner cities for suburban homes subsidized by federally underwritten mortgages 
and on highways built with federal funds.282 Further, the location of the highways 
                                                     
279 “Just as students of society know that race still matters, students of American 
history understand that ghetto and barrio schools are not natural, but manmade. They grew 
from a tangled mix of forces. This includes the blatant racial discrimination in housing and 
seemingly ‘race-neutral’ zoning, and mortgage lending and real estate practices that over 
many decades corralled people of color and the poor into what are now overburdened 
communities and schools.” Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan Eaton, From Little Rock to 
Seattle and Louisville: Is “All Deliberate Speed” Stuck in Reverse? 30 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 279, 288 (2008). 
280  See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 149 (1998); see also Alice 
O’Connor, Historical Perspectives on Race and Community Revitalization, THE ASPEN 
INST., http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/9OConnor.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2013) (“[H]istory, with its central concern for human agency, shows 
unequivocally that there is nothing ‘natural’ or inevitable about the racialized ‘pockets’ of 
concentrated poverty that have become an accepted part of the urban—and rural—United 
States.”).  
Denton and Massey argue for dismantling the ghettos through integrationist policies. 
For a critique of their approach, see John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of 
Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1233, 1245 (1995) (arguing that the culture of segregation thesis is a variation on the 
culture of poverty thesis that perpetuates stereotypes of the poor). 
281 See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 50–52. As a result, property owners in 
the inner cities could not sell their properties, which declined in value and led to a “pattern 
of disrepair, deterioration, vacancy, and abandonment.” Id. at 55; see also Florence 
Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 669–
70 (2002). 
282 See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 44. “As poor blacks from the south 
entered cities in large numbers, middle-class whites fled to the suburbs to escape them and 
to insulate themselves from the social problems that accompanied the rising tide of poor.” 
Id. at 55; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 46 (1996) (“By 
manipulating market incentives, the federal government drew middle-class whites to the 
suburbs and, in effect, trapped blacks in the inner cities.”). 
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destroyed many viable low-income communities and created physical barriers 
within cities that separated poor neighborhoods from central business districts.283 
In turn, suburban planners used zoning and other exclusionary policies, such as 
restrictive deeds, to keep out blacks and other minorities.284  
These segregated housing patterns were then reinforced by urban renewal 
programs in the 1950s and 1960s, which compounded the isolation of poor blacks 
by clearing slum neighborhoods in the cities to make way for redevelopment of 
central business districts.285 Displaced blacks were forced into new, high-density 
public housing projects situated in already crowded black neighborhoods, which 
became further destabilized.286 Urban problems intensified in the 1970s, despite 
the civil rights movement and rising incomes among black workers, due to subtle 
(and ongoing) forms of racial discrimination in which “blacks [were] 
systematically shown, recommended, and invited to inspect many fewer homes 
than comparably qualified whites.”287 Thus, segregated housing patterns did not 
emerge by private choice; rather minorities “do not now, nor have they ever had 
the range of housing choices that are available to whites with comparable incomes 
and credit histories.” 288  Yet the federal government has failed to enforce the 
nation’s fair housing laws, thereby permitting segregated housing patterns to 
continue. 289  In short, government policies have been a key factor in creating 
housing segregation, which in turn leads to school segregation, and vice versa.290 
The Parents Involved plurality ignores this history. As a result of Parents 
Involved, local school districts and education advocates are going back to the 
                                                     
283 See WILSON, supra note 282, at 47; Michael Katz, Reframing the Underclass 
Debate, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS 
68 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999). 
284 See WILSON, supra note 282, at 50–51 (“Many states delegate broad powers to 
localities that allow them to separate from predominantly poor and minority central cities”). 
285 See Katz, supra note 283, at 68. 
286 See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 55–56. 
287 See id. at 104; see also id. at 60–82, 98–100. “Although each individual act of 
discrimination may be small and subtle, together they have a powerful cumulative effect in 
lowering the probability of black entry into white neighborhoods.” Id. at 98.  
288  Leland Ware, The Demographics of Desegregation: Residential Segregation 
Remains High 40 Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 1157 
(2005). 
289  See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart: How the Government Betrayed a 
Landmark Civil Rights Law, PRO PUBLICA, Oct. 28, 2012 (describing how the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development gave billions of dollars to cities from the 1960s to the 
present without enforcing fair housing laws). 
290 School segregation also influences housing choices. As Justice Blackmun stated, 
“schools that are demonstrably black or white provide a signal to these families, 
perpetuating and intensifying the residential movement.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 
513 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Erika Frankenberg, Metropolitan School 
and Housing Desegregation, 18 J. AFF. HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 193, 195 (2009) 
(discussing “the reciprocal effects that school and housing patterns can have on each 
other”). 
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drawing board to devise new ways to ensure racial and socioeconomic diversity.291 
Perhaps the “silver lining” of the Court’s jurisprudence is that pursuit of 
socioeconomic diversity raises no constitutional flags because wealth 
discrimination is viewed under a lenient rational basis test. 292  The class 
achievement gap is now larger than the racial achievement gap. Currently, eighty 
school districts, educating over four million children, use some form of 
socioeconomic school integration.293 Supporters assert that socioeconomic integ-
ration raises achievement of low-income students, without any negative impacts on 
other students. 294  Others are more skeptical about the benefits of the 
socioeconomic approach, noting that it does not lead to significant racial mixing or 
overcome the racial achievement gap.295 “Class-based solutions do not consider the 
fact that white resistance to being in predominantly black neighborhoods is 
independent of class and that the highest-income black families are as segregated 
from white counterparts as the lowest-income.”296 Thus, class-based solutions may 
not be able to overcome the racial dimension of income inequality. In sum, it 
remains to be seen whether class-based integration can reduce educational 
inequality. 
 
2.  School Financing 
 
When civil rights advocates became discouraged by the slow pace of 
desegregation in the 1960s, they began litigating to secure equal financing of 
schools. 297  School district boundaries reinforced existing patterns of housing 
                                                     
291 See Black, supra note 252, at 5.  
292 Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 599, 635 (2008).  
293 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Integrating Rich and Poor Matters Most, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/20/is-segregation-back-in- 
us-public-schools/integrating-rich-and-poor-matters-most. 
294 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 
1557 (2007).  
295 Minow, supra note 292, at 638; Ogletree & Eaton, supra note 279, at 288. Some 
conservatives dislike socioeconomic integration because they fear it is a proxy for race, as 
well as ineffective. See, e.g., Issues in K-12 Education: SELECTIONS FROM CQ 
RESEARCHER 8–9 (2010) (summarizing objections). 
296 Gary Orfield, Response, POVERTY & RACE (Sept./Oct. 2001) available at http://ww 
w.prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=711&item_id=7761&newsletter_id=58&header=Sympos 
ium:%20Socioeconomic%20School%20Integration. “Student assignment plans that use 
poverty tend to exclude remedies for minority middle-class students, who are often isolated 
in inferior schools and behind in achievement.” SPENCER & RENO, supra note 240, at 8. 
297  James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 253 (1999) 
(“School finance litigation began in the late 1960s, at a time when civil rights advocates 
were growing disillusioned with the pace and progress of desegregation.”). 
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segregation.298 At the same time, state legislatures have little incentive to equalize 
funding across school districts given that suburban districts predominate in terms 
of voting power and political clout.299 Accordingly, in 1968 a group of parents 
turned to the courts to challenge Texas’s education financing system, which was 
funded largely through local property taxes, resulting in disparities between 
wealthy and poor districts. 300  In San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,301 the Supreme Court rejected their claim, holding that unequal finan-
cing schemes did not violate the Constitution. The Court concluded that strict 
scrutiny of the law was not triggered because the poor did not constitute a suspect 
class302 and because education is not a fundamental right.303 While acknowledging 
that education is important to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and the right to vote, the Court asserted that education is not guaranteed by the text 
of the Constitution.304 Moreover, the Court ruled that the school-financing scheme 
was a form of economic and social legislation subject to rational basis review, 
which in turn demands deference to legislative choices.305 As the Court stated, “the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic 
pressures of those who elect them.”306 This paean to deference is missing in the 
most recent desegregation cases. 
                                                     
298  Wilson, supra note 240, at 628 (explaining how the “Supreme Court[] has 
arguably contributed to the inter-district disparities by legitimizing the primacy of localism 
in its school equity jurisprudence”) (emphasis omitted).  
299  Robinson, supra note 236, at 434; see Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as 
Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 
96 (2010) (“Residents of more affluent counties . . . are unlikely to support a more 
redistributive mechanism for financing local government or otherwise providing services 
when the status quo so clearly operates to their immediate benefit.”).  
300 See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The 
wealthiest school district in San Antonio spent $594 per pupil, while the poorest district 
spent $356 per student. Id. at 12–13. 
301 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  
302 Id. at 28. (“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none 
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position 
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.”).  
303 Id. at 35. 
304 Id. at 35–37.  
305 Id. at 40. 
306 Id. at 59. The Court has continued to uphold state laws burdening the access of the 
poor to education. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) 
(rejecting a challenge by poor families to a state law permitting local school districts to 
charge a fee for bus usage). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (striking down 
a Texas law that required undocumented immigrants to pay for public school education due 
to the unfairness of penalizing children for their parents’ choices and in light of the 
importance of education to “maintaining the fabric of our society”). 
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Like the twenty-first century desegregation cases, the financing cases reflect 
the Justices’ assumptions about the underlying causes of the challenged inequities. 
The Court majority in Rodriguez viewed the financing disparities as resulting from 
inevitable residential patterns created by “the growth of commercial and industrial 
centers and accompanying shifts in population.” 307  As the Court viewed these 
housing patterns, the Justices concluded, “[i]t is equally inevitable that some 
localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.”308 The 
majority commented that wealth is not “a static quantity,” and it can change “from 
any number of events, some of which local residents can and do influence,” as well 
as from public and private incentives for businesses to locate within certain 
districts.309 In this view, the state has no responsibility to correct for segregated 
housing patterns because these patterns result primarily from market forces. 
By contrast, in dissent, Justice Marshall went further in identifying 
government as a cause for educational inequality, emphasizing “the extent to 
which . . . the State is responsible for the wealth discrimination in this instance.”310 
As he explained, the state not only created local school districts and tied school 
funding to the local property tax, it also “imposed land use controls [that] have 
undoubtedly encouraged and rigidified natural trends in the allocation of particular 
areas for residential or commercial use, and thus determined each district’s amount 
of taxable property wealth.” 311  For Justice Marshall, the extent of state 
involvement warranted close scrutiny of the state’s financing decisions; for the 
majority, the financing patterns reflected preordained, mostly private choices.  
As a result of Rodriguez, there are no federal constitutional constraints on 
unequal education spending, and not surprisingly, vast disparities remain within 
and between states. Even federal funding under Title I, the education law designed 
to support low-income schools, creates and permits disparities. 312  On average, 
schools with high levels of poor students spend $825 fewer per pupil than higher 
income schools, creating an average shortfall of over $500,000 in a typical low-
income elementary school.313 In light of these disparities and the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of poor students, advocates have challenged unequal school 
financing in state courts, relying on state constitutional provisions that provide a 
right to education.314 The results have been mixed.315 Even where lawsuits have 
                                                     
307 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 48. 
308 Id. at 54. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
311 Id. at 123–24. 
312 See Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection 
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 315 (2010).  
313 Id. at 315–16 (“If one factors in the additional cost associated with educating poor 
students, that gap actually jumps to over $1300 per student.”).  
314  See, e.g., Pruitt, supra note 299, at 80–81 (2010) (stating that some state 
constitutions provide greater educational rights than the federal Constitution). 
315 For a summary of school finance litigation and its impacts, see RYAN, supra note 
236, at 145–70. 
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been successful, changes to financing systems have been modest and failed to 
remedy the challenges facing poor schools.316 School financing lawsuits also do 
not enhance racial or socioeconomic diversity. 317  Further, state-based consti-
tutional litigation cannot address the wide disparities between states. 318  Thus, 
unequal school financing—reinforced by the Supreme Court—remains a problem 
underlying educational inequality.319 
 
3.  Affirmative Action and Higher Education 
 
A college degree is increasingly associated with higher lifetime earnings,320 as 
well as better health, longer life expectancy, and increased civic involvement.321 
However, there is an income gap impacting college access and graduation rates.322 
Whereas 80% of high school graduates from the upper quintile of the income 
distribution attend college, only 44% do so from the bottom quintile.323 In top tier 
colleges, 74% of the students come from the top quartile, while 3% come from the 
bottom quartile.324 This attendance and graduation gap is driven by several factors 
that plague low-income schools, including lower-quality preparation in K-12 
education, less ability by students to afford college, decreasing financial assistance 
for low-income students, and a lack of understanding of the college application 
                                                     
316 See Robinson, supra note 236, at 436 (reviewing RYAN, supra note 236) (“Instead, 
resulting school finance reforms typically focus on modest increases in funding levels for 
low-wealth districts while simultaneously maintaining existing funding levels or raising 
more slowly the funding rate for wealthier districts. This approach preserves the fiscal 
autonomy of wealthier, typically suburban school districts.”) (citations omitted).  
317 See Ryan, supra note 297, at 255. 
318  David Karen & Kevin J. Dougherty, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Higher 
Education as a Strategy of Social Mobility, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE: 
COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 242, at 33 (higher 
education is “the necessary passport to middle-class success”). See generally Goodwin Liu, 
Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044 (2006) 
(examining “the empirical and policy dimensions of the problem of interstate inequality”). 
319 See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009). In Horne, a 5-4 majority overturned the 
lower court rulings that Arizona had failed to adequately fund English Language Learner 
(“ELL”) programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. The Court 
decided that the Act’s “ultimate focus is on the quality of educational programming and 
services provided to students, not the amount of money spent on them.” Id. at 466–67. In so 
ruling, the Court intimated that the achievement gap facing ELL students was not impacted 
by funding, but rather by other causes, “such as drug use and the prevalence of gangs.” Id. 
at 467 n.20. Of course, these causes allow the Court to place the blame for the achievement 
gap on ELL students themselves, rather than the school districts that serve them. 
320 Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 242, at 135.  
321 Karen & Dougherty, supra note 318, at 36. 
322 Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 242, at 126. 
323 Id.  
324 Id. at 130. 
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process.325 Thus, higher education is not promoting social equality to the extent 
possible.326 
One mechanism to expand college access for minority students is affirmative 
action. Initially, affirmative action was designed to equalize access to higher 
education in light of our history, in which colleges enrolled few minorities due to 
overt segregation and discriminatory admissions policies.327 Currently, the Court 
approves affirmative action for a separate rationale of ensuring diversity, which the 
Court recognizes as a compelling state interest. 328 In 2013 the Court held in Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin329 that the means a university uses to achieve racial 
diversity must be narrowly tailored and are subject to strict scrutiny.330 It remains 
unclear whether and how universities will be able to meet this stringent standard.  
Accordingly, like desegregation at the K-12 level, this may be another area 
where class-based affirmative action will become increasingly attractive to 
colleges looking to maintain diverse student bodies. Here, too, the lack of 
constitutional protection for class may prove beneficial for low-income and 
minority students, as any college wishing to diversify socioeconomically would be 
subject to a lenient rational basis review standard. However, the efficacy of class-
based affirmative action is unclear. On the one hand, some charge that emphasis on 
class may reduce racial diversity, given that poor whites not only outnumber 
blacks, but also tend to have higher scores.331 In other words, even within social 
classes, resources and opportunities are distributed unequally and on a racialized 
basis.332 On the other hand, it appears that some carefully constructed class-based 
plans can boost both socioeconomic and racial diversity. 333 At the same time, 
                                                     
325 Id. at 127, 135–37. 
326 Id. at 128. 
327 See Angelo N. Ancheta, After Grutter and Gratz: Higher Education, Race, and the 
Law, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 242, at 175. The Court took 
this rationale off the table in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 
(1978). 
328 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (citing 
Bakke, 438 U. S. at 307–09 (1978)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).  
329 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
330 Id. at 2419. 
331 See Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 452, 465–66 (1997). 
332  See Carson Byrd et al., Class-Based Policies are Not a Remedy for Racial 
Inequality, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Sept. 30, 2011, at B37 (“While poor white children also 
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LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 132 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 
2004) (“Race and ethnicity matter in the distribution of opportunity, independent of other 
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333 See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., A 
BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO 
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skeptics will be eager to challenge class-based plans that look like proxies for race, 
making litigation over race-based and socioeconomic affirmative action a reality 
for years to come.  
 
D.  Politics and Power 
 
Shortly before the 2012 presidential election, over 80% of Americans stated 
that there is too much corporate money in politics.334 Americans understand the 
power wielded by money in politics but may not fully comprehend how the 
Supreme Court supports this financial scaffolding. If the political system 
contributes to economic inequality, then it is important to understand how law 
impacts politics. As this Part explains, the Supreme Court has directed political 
outcomes, dismantled congressional attempts to rein in corporate political spending, 
and undermined the electoral process for low-income voters. In each of these areas, 
the 1% flourishes, while the 99% becomes increasingly disenfranchised. 
 
1.  Supreme Court Influence over Politics 
 
A main tenet of the OWS movement is that income and wealth inequality are 
not driven solely by economics, but also by politics. Political scientists have 
analyzed how political decisions reinforce and create economic inequality, both 
through affirmative legislation, as well as through drift, or failure to respond to 
changing circumstances.335 As noted above, studies show that at the federal level, 
senators ignore the policy preferences of people at the low end of the income 
ladder, are minimally attuned to the middle, and are highly responsive to high-
income voters.336 Further, there are partisan differences within these trends; pol-
itical scientist Larry Bartels has shown that Republican senators are about twice as 
responsive to high-income voters as compared to Democratic senators.337  
Moreover, Bartels found that over the last fifty years, the incomes of middle-
class families grew twice as fast under Democratic Administrations than they did 
under Republican administrations, while the incomes of the working poor grew six 
times as fast under Democrats.338 This pattern results from partisan differences in 
                                                     
RACIAL PREFERENCES (2012), available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf; 
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2014] A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT 435 
macroeconomic policies.339 In short, “a great deal of economic inequality in the 
contemporary United States is specifically attributable to the policies and priorities 
of Republican presidents.”340 Bartels notes that in his first term, “President George 
W. Bush presided over a 2% cumulative increase in the real incomes of families at 
the 95th percentile of the income distribution,” while there was a simultaneous 1% 
drop in the real incomes for the middle class and a 3% drop for the working 
poor.341 By contrast, if Vice President Gore had governed over this time period, the 
real incomes of the working poor would likely have grown 6%, the real incomes of 
the middle class would have grown by 4.5%, and the real incomes of the top 5% 
would have remained unchanged.342 
Of course, President George W. Bush can thank the Supreme Court for his 
presidency. In Bush v. Gore,343 the Supreme Court decided the outcome of the 
November 2000 Presidential election.344 Preceding the decision, Vice President 
Gore had a popular vote advantage of over a half million votes and a slight 
advantage in electoral college votes (267 versus President Bush’s 246). 345 The 
election came down to Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes.346 Out of almost 
six million votes cast in Florida, and after a statutorily required machine recount in 
the event of close elections, Governor George W. Bush led Gore by 327 votes.347 
Gore relied on Florida’s election law to challenge the results, and the Florida 
Supreme Court ordered a recount of all ballots that either indicated no presidential 
preference or more than one.348 The dispute culminated in the Bush v. Gore349 
decision, in which the Court stopped the recount.350  
In its per curiam decision, the majority held that the use of manual recounts 
violated the Equal Protection Clause because there were no uniform standards 
governing how to discern voter intent on ambiguous ballots, and moreover, that it 
was too late to implement proper procedures.351 However, as Justice Stevens stated 
                                                     
339 Id. at 3, 34–42. 
340 Id. at 3. Data “impl[ies] that continuous Democratic control would have produced 
an essentially constant level of economic inequality over the past three decades, despite all 
the technological, demographic, and global competitive forces emphasized in economists’ 
accounts of escalating inequality.” BARTELS, supra note 24, at 61. 
341 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 63. 
342 Id. 
343 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
344 Id. 
345 Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 325, 330 (2001). 
346 Id. 
347 Id. 
348 See id. at 330–36. 
349 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
350 Id. at 98, 110. For a more in-depth timeline of the developments that led to Bush v. 
Gore, see Briffault, supra note 345, at 330–41. 
351 531 U.S. at 105–06, 110. There are wide variations within and between states as to 
how elections are administered, yet “[b]y the Court’s reasoning all of these variations 
violated equal protection.” Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore? 
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in dissent, the decision disenfranchised many voters whose ballots did reveal their 
intent—thus creating an equal protection problem for those voters.352 Indeed, the 
losers were largely people of color, the elderly, and the poor, since many of them 
face structural barriers to casting a perfect ballot, such as voting booth time limits, 
lack of help for illiterate voters, and complex ballot technology. 353  Professor 
Spencer Overton has further elaborated that the Court’s stress on a voter’s ability 
to cast a perfect ballot emphasizes the merits of individual voters while ignoring 
barriers facing people of color and denying them full political participation.354 
Overall, the overwhelming weight of media and academic commentary deemed the 
decision highly partisan, given that the conservative Justices that constituted the 
majority abandoned their professed commitments to states’ rights, a narrow 
interpretation of equal protection, and judicial restraint.355 The decision not only 
replicated patterns of economic inequality by disenfranchising certain groups of 
voters, but it also enhanced Republican preeminence in the executive and judicial 
branches, leading to policies that further entrenched economic inequality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 17 (2002); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary 
Between Law and Politics, 1110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1427–28 (2001) (noting the variety of 
voting procedures used by states and their subdivisions and commenting that the “irony is 
that when the Florida Supreme Court tried to step in to remedy the problems caused by 
differences in technology, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this—and not the more serious 
technological differences—constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).  
352 531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
353 Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23, 
48 (2002). Guinier notes that although blacks made up 16% of the voting population, they 
constituted 54% of ballots that were rejected by voting machines. Id.; see also Spencer 
Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 469, 483 (2001) (explaining that the Court’s merit-based vision either ignores or 
tolerates barriers such as “lower education, a greater percentage of first-time voters, a 
greater reluctance to ask for assistance, segregated residential patterns, and substandard 
voting equipment and assistance at the polls in predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods”).  
Compare Overton’s explanation of why some voters struggle at the polls to Justice 
O’Connor’s impatient question during the oral argument of Bush v. Gore, in which she 
asked, “Well, why isn’t the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for 
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949).  
354 Overton, supra note 353, at 472, 476–77, 481–82. 
355 See David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1429–30 
(2006) (describing the “overwhelmingly critical” reaction to the decision); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 351, at 18 (“The supreme irony of the case is that the majority 
was comprised of five Justices who are revolutionizing constitutional law through their 
commitment to federalism and states’ rights, but here showed no deference whatsoever to 
the state court.”). 
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2.  Business Influence over Politics  
 
Businesses influence politics in many ways—from donating to political 
campaigns to running ads supporting or denouncing politicians to lobbying 
politicians once they are in office. There are almost no restraints on the extent or 
form of corporate influence over politics, and this is a factor in maintaining 
economic inequality. Still, the Court has struck down Congress’s own attempts to 
limit its exposure to corporate influence.  
As Professors Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal have 
demonstrated, both political polarization and economic inequality have swelled 
since 1975, and they are linked because polarization creates gridlock, thus making 
it difficult to redress inequality.356 Republican electoral success has driven extreme 
polarization,357 resulting in a decline in the real value of the minimum wage, a drop 
in the estate tax rate, and lower federal income tax rates at the top of the income 
scale. 358  In other words, people at the top of the income scale are obtaining 
economically beneficial policies; those at the bottom are not. Escalating campaign 
expenditures feed polarization, as a small group of extremely wealthy contributors 
can focus their funds on politicians who support their ideology. 359  Because 
Democrats are just as dependent as Republicans on campaign funds, they have 
similarly failed to take on economic inequality as an issue and have become 
increasingly probusiness. 360  Moreover, in today’s polarized climate, taking 
extreme political positions makes fundraising easier,361 and funds are desperately 
needed to meet the expenses of media and advertising that drive modern 
campaigns. 362  Despite congressional efforts to rein in campaign financing, the 
Supreme Court has reinforced the primacy of corporate money in politics, most 
recently in Citizens United v. FEC.363  
                                                     
356  NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED 
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 3, 165–66 (2006); see also 
Linda Feldmann, Pew Survey: Partisan Polarization in U.S. Hits 25-Year High, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (June 4, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0604/Pew-sur 
vey-Partisan-polarization-in-US-hits-25-year-high.  
357 Voter preferences are tied to income, with high-income voters more likely to 
support Republicans than low-income voters, who tend to support Democrats. MCCARTY, 
POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 356, at 71, 106–07.  
358 Id. at 168–72 
359 Id. at 141, 160–61 (“The American economy . . . has created thousands of not-so-
typical American multimillionaires and billionaires who have the resources to make 
contributions substantial enough to have a major effect on electoral outcomes.”); see also 
Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Widening Gyre: Inequality, Polarization, and the Crisis, 
in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 10 (“[I]ncreased income and wealth of a small 
minority has, in effect, bought the allegiance of a major political party.”).  
360 See LESSIG, supra note 45, at 96–98; HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, 179–82; 
MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 356, at 142. 
361 LESSIG, supra note 45, at 97. 
362 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 181. 
363 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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The modern era of campaign finance law arose in 1974 in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal when Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA), a campaign finance law that, among other things, limited campaign 
contribution amounts, limited how much candidates could spend on a campaign, 
and required disclosures for entities engaging in express advocacy.364 In ruling on 
the constitutionality of FECA in 1976, the Court held in Buckley v. Valeo365 that 
Congress could mandate disclosures and limit individual political contributions, as 
they do not constitute speech or raise the risk of quid pro quo contributions to 
candidates.366 However, the restrictions on political expenditures, or money spent 
on communications to voters, were invalid because such restrictions “limit political 
expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms.”367  
After Buckley, the Court waffled in its deference to congressionally enacted 
campaign spending limits. 368  In 1990, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,369 the Court upheld electoral spending limits on corporations in order 
to limit the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 370 
Nevertheless, by the 1990s, soft money, or money spent by political parties for 
party building, began pouring into the political process through issue ads, which 
avoided FECA regulations of express advocacy.371 Entities such as PACs, 527s, 
and other nonprofit groups also funded issue ads, which avoided forbidden “magic 
words” that urge viewers to vote for or against a particular candidate, but are still 
designed to shape electoral outcomes.372 Congress passed the McCain-Feingold 
Act in 2002 to close this soft money loophole in campaign finance law.373 Among 
other things, the Act prohibited corporations and unions from running 
electioneering broadcast ads thirty days before primaries and sixty days before 
general elections.374  
                                                     
364  James A. Gardner & Guy-Uriel Charles, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 640–52 (2012).  
365 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
366 Id. at 143. 
367 Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
368 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 586 (2011) (“Since Buckley, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence has 
swung like a pendulum toward and away from deference . . . however, the Court has not 
formally overturned any of its campaign finance precedents until Citizens United.”). 
369 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
370 Id. at 660. 
371 See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 252 (2010) 
(defining soft money and its application after Buckley). 
372 See Hasen, supra note 368, at 588–89.  
373  Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 §101, 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441i(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also Hasen, supra note 368, at 588–89 (describing 
the McCain-Feingold Act and its purpose). 
374 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a). 
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Initially, in McConnell v. FEC,375 the Court held that the McCain-Feingold 
Act permissibly restricted corporate and union funded ads that were “the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.” 376  However, the tide began to turn with the 
additions of Justices Roberts and Alito to the Court and the decision in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,377 in which the Court took a narrow view of express 
advocacy and ruled that government could only restrict corporate spending on 
advertising that was “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an 
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”378 
In Citizens United,379 the Court went even further, striking down all campaign 
finance prohibitions on corporate expenditures—whether for express or issue 
advocacy. 380 Such prohibitions were found to be unconstitutional because “the 
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on 
the speaker’s identity.”381 Citizens United resulted from an anti-Hillary Clinton 
documentary shown on cable television via video-on-demand before the 
presidential primaries of 2008 in violation of McCain-Feingold electioneering 
restrictions.382 According to the Court, it would be unfair to permit individuals and 
unincorporated associations free rein to spend on independent expenditures, while 
“certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate 
form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech.” 383  Based on 
Citizens United, federal courts and the FEC have subsequently opened the door to 
unlimited contributions by individuals or groups to super PACs,384 which were 
previously limited to $5,000 donations.385 Critics of the decision, and there are 
many, 386  have remarked on the Court’s overly solicitous stance toward 
corporations given that “a corporation is an economic entity, not a citizen; a profit-
making enterprise, not an enlightened intelligence; a creature of the law, not a 
                                                     
375 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
376 Id. at 206–07. 
377 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
378 Id. at 451. 
379 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
380 Id. at 365. 
381 Id. at 350. 
382 Id. at 319–20. 
383 Id. at 356. 
384 A super PAC is technically known as an independent-expenditure-only committee; 
these groups may not donate money directly to political candidates, but they can raise 
unlimited sums to advocate for or against political candidates. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. 
RES. SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf. 
385 See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
provision limiting contributions by individuals to political committees that made only 
independent expenditures violated the First Amendment); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 
25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (striking down restrictions on use of soft money by nonconnected 
committees). 
386 See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2012) (summarizing the critical response). 
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partner in a democratic project of political self-governance.”387 As Justice Stevens 
remarked in his dissent, “[corporations] are not themselves members of ‘We the 
People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”388 
Importantly, Citizens United has implications beyond corporate spending. In 
its opinion, the Court narrowed its conception of corruption to quid pro quo 
campaign donations and rejected Austin’s endorsement of the antidistortion 
interest.389 In other words, “[a]ny concern for political equality—for limiting the 
ability of the wealthy to deploy their financial advantage in the political arena—
has been ruled out.”390 Yet, as Lawrence Lessig points out, corruption arises from 
more than bribes.391 Although such unsavory incidents do occasionally occur, a far 
more pervasive corrupting influence comes from the normalization of dependency, 
that is, “a corruption practiced by decent people” that leads politicians to focus 
their efforts on initiatives favored by their financial supporters, simultaneously 
souring citizens on democracy. 392  Justice Stevens put it succinctly in dissent: 
“[c]orruption operates along a spectrum.”393 Yet, after Citizens United, individuals, 
corporations and other groups do not have to limit themselves to issue advertising 
but can engage in express advocacy to elect or defeat certain candidates. Thus, 
Citizens United results in “the nearly complete deregulation of independent 
expenditures,”394 or as Michael Kang writes, “the end of campaign finance law as 
we knew it.”395  
Indeed, there has been a flood of money from outside groups in recent 
elections; in 2010 outside groups spent $300 million, constituting an increase of 
168% in House races and 44% in Senate races compared to 2008. 396 In 2012 
Citizens United led to almost $1 billion in new spending out of the $6 billion spent 
total, which is more than outside groups spent in the prior four election cycles 
combined.397 Time will tell if citizens, bombarded by corporate electioneering, will 
                                                     
387 Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2011); 
see also Kang, supra note 386, at 12–13. 
388 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
389 Id. at 363.  
390Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. Rev. 887, 890 (2011). 
391 LESSIG, supra note 45, at 106–07. 
392 Id. at 8. 
393 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 448. 
394 Kang, supra note 386, at 5. 
395 Id. at 4. 
396 Id. at 37–38; see also Winter, supra note 387, at 1134 (estimating that outside 
spending exceeded $448 million in 2010); Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie: If 
You Aren’t Sure Citizens United Gave Rise to the Super PACs, Just Follow the Money, 
SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2 
012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_camp 
aign_spending_.html. 
397 Reity O’Brien, Court Opened Door to $933 Million in New Election Spending, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 16, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/0 
2014] A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT 441 
become cynical and disenchanted, and whether lawmakers will feel compelled to 
bend to corporate desires. 398  Professor Gene Nichol writes despairingly that 
Citizens United rests on a “foundational conclusion that the United States 
Constitution, ultimately, secures a power for people of wealth to use their 
disproportionate economic resources to get their way in our politics.” 399 In so 
doing, the Court overturned legislative judgments and elevated its own values over 
those of the politically accountable branches. Justice Stevens summed up the irony 
of the decision: “[w]hile American democracy is imperfect, few outside the 
majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate 
money in politics.”400 
 
3.  Declining Political Participation by the Poor 
 
While money is playing an increasing role in influencing the legislative 
agenda, the poor are participating in politics in lower numbers than other 
Americans and at decreasing rates. There are many reasons behind this trend: the 
poor have less access to skills and resources that facilitate participation; they have 
weaker ties to civic organizations and to trade unions that mobilize participation; 
and they are not targeted by interest groups.401 In addition, the poor face instit-
utional barriers that can limit their participation, such as felon disenfranchisement 
laws, citizen-initiated voter registration systems, and workday voting schedules.402 
Furthermore, the poor become discouraged about the efficacy of political 
participation when they observe social welfare cutbacks and personally interact 
with government bureaucracies, where they often face demeaning and skeptical 
treatment.403 Part of the decline is also linked to increasing residential segregation; 
the least political participation exists among low-income Americans who live in 
low-income counties. 404 “The result is that, as the most affluent become more 
segregated from other parts of American society, the social ecologies that provide 
                                                     
1/16/12027/court-opened-door-933-million-new-election-spending; ADAM CROWTHER, PU-
BLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH DIVISION, OUTSIDE MONEY TAKES THE INSIDE TRACK 3 
(Taylor Lincoln ed., 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/outsid e-
spending-dominates-2012-election-report.pdf. It appears that corporations accounted for 
only part of this spending; money mainly flowed from highly partisan groups who do not 
have to disclose their contributors. Kang, supra note 386, at 6. 
398 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 471 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Congress was entitled to take these concerns into account and to receive 
deference for its judgments).  
399 Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (2011).  
400 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
401 Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the 
American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 98 (2009). 
402 Id. 
403 See id. at 113–14. 
404 See id. at 122. 
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the most basic backdrop for political life grow farther apart and more unequal as 
conditions for political engagement.”405  
For its part, the Court has recently reinforced the decline in political 
participation by the poor by putting on its “class-blinders” in electoral cases. In 
Crawford v. Marion County, 406  the Court upheld an Indiana election law that 
required citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo 
identification.407 The challengers alleged that the new law substantially burdened 
their right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, further, that the 
law was unnecessary to combat voter fraud.408 Indeed, even the majority conceded 
that the record contains no evidence of any voter fraud actually occurring in 
Indiana at any time in its history.409 Nevertheless, the Court held that the State’s 
interest in orderly administration outweighed any burden to voters in obtaining 
identification.410  
In dissent, Justice Souter highlighted the burdens on poor, old, and disabled 
voters to travel to the bureau of motor vehicles, especially given the limited public 
transportation in Indiana and paucity of license branches. 411  In addition, the 
required documentation for a voter identification card, such as a birth certificate or 
United States passport, could be costly for “the poor, the old, and the immobile.”412 
Justice Souter also pointed out the restricted nature of Indiana’s law when it comes 
to provisional ballots, which are ballots filled out by voters who arrive at the polls 
lacking proper identification. 413  In Indiana, anyone who fills out a provisional 
ballot and wants their vote counted must go to a circuit court or election board 
within ten days of the election to sign an affidavit—another potentially costly trip 
“uncomfortably close to the outright $1.50 fee we struck down 42 years ago” in 
Harper, outlawing the poll tax.414 
                                                     
405 Id. at 123. 
406 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
407 Id. at 204. 
408 Id. at 187. 
409 Id. at 194. 
410 Id. at 196. 
411 Id. at 211–16 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
412 Id. at 216 (2008). 
413 Id. at 216–18. 
414 Id. at 237 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966)). A 
win for voting rights occurred in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 133 S. Ct. 
2247 (2013), when the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law requiring proof of 
citizenship for voter registration on federal forms on the grounds that federal law (the 
National Voter Registration Act) preempted the state law. Id. at 2254–57. Only about 5% 
of Arizona voters registered via the federal form versus the state form. Michael Muskal, 
Arizona to Keep Requiring Citizenship Proof on State Voter Forms, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/17/nation/la-na-nn-arizona-officials-to-continu 
e-requiring-citizenship-on-state-voter-registration-forms-20130617.  
The state form is still allowed to ask for proof of citizenship. 133 S. Ct. at 2255. 
Moreover, the Court left open the possibility that the state could ask the Federal Election 
Assistance Commission to include state-specific instructions on the federal form. Id. at 
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The Court delivered another blow to minority electoral access in Shelby 
County, Alabama v. Holder,415 in which it struck down Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act by a 5-4 vote.416 Section 4 identified certain jurisdictions with histories 
of voting discrimination.417 In turn, Section 5 required those jurisdictions to seek 
preclearance, or approval, from the Justice Department before making any changes 
to their voting systems, such as changing polling place locations or hours or 
altering voting district boundaries. 418  Thus, Section 5, considered the most 
effective civil rights statute ever enacted, is now effectively dead.419 Congress had 
reauthorized the Act as recently as 2006, extending it for twenty-five years.420 
Nevertheless, writing for the majority, Justice Roberts contended that changing 
political conditions over the last fifty years, exemplified by increased minority 
voter registration and minority elected officials, no longer warranted the Act’s 
“extraordinary measures.”421 As he stated, “Coverage today is based on decades-
old data and eradicated practices” that have “no logical relation to the present 
day.”422 Justice Ginsberg, in dissent (for Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), 
disagreed, arguing that deference to Congress’s judgment in protecting the right to 
vote was warranted, especially in light of a voluminous legislative record of recent 
examples of discrimination in voting, particularly through “second generation” 
tactics designed to dilute the minority vote. 423  She warned, “[t]hrowing out 
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory 
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not 
getting wet.”424 As she predicted, the impact of Shelby County has been swift. 
Immediately, Texas and Mississippi announced they would effectuate voter 
identification laws; 425  these laws disproportionately impact poor and minority 
                                                     
2259–60. Thus, because Arizona has indicated it will do so, this victory for voting rights 
may be short-lived and its impact limited.  
415 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
416 Id. at 2631. 
417 Id. at 2619–20. 
418 Id. at 2620. The test for Section 5 coverage was articulated in Section 4: States or 
political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of 
November 1, 1964, and had fewer than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964 
Presidential election. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438, § 4(b) 
(1965). Covered jurisdictions could also seek preclearance approval from the District Court 
for the District of Columbia. Id. 
419 133 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
420 Id. at 2621. 
421 Id. at 2619, 2625. 
422 Id. at 2617. 
423 Id. at 2632, 2636 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
424 Id. at 2650. “All told, between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 
voting changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory.” Id. at 2639 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 21 (2006)). 
425 See Bill Barrow, Voting Rights Act Ruling Prompts Action by States, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 26, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/voting-rights- 
act-states_n_3502062.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting 
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voters. In light of the role of money in political campaigns and policy-making, one 
might query whether giving low-income individuals and minorities access to the 
polls matters. In other words, do Crawford and Shelby County matter? Professor 
Larry Bartels answers yes, explaining that the views of poor people have an 
indirect effect because their votes can tip an election toward a Democrat rather 
than a Republican.426 They may not have a direct influence on politicians once they 
are elected, but by shaping who enters office, the poor can impact the course of 
public policy.427  
 
III.  EXPLANATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
 
On January 20, 2012, around two hundred demonstrators took to the steps of 
the Supreme Court to protest the Citizens United decision on its second 
anniversary.428 Nearly a dozen people were arrested after storming through police 
barricades.429 Asked why she was demonstrating at the Court, one protestor said, 
“This is the scene of the crime.”430 The “occupiers” might have been even more 
numerous and agitated if they knew the extent of the Court’s bias toward 
corporations, disdain for the poor, and suspicion of equality-promoting legislation. 
Protests are certainly one way to register dissent. While the Court is unlikely to 
make decisions based on public pressure, the Justices are clearly aware of public 
mood. Today, the lasting influence of the Occupy movement is its impact on 
public opinion. Any future strategies for reform must consider the motivations 
underlying Court decision-making processes. Accordingly, this Part offers some 
explanations for Court doctrines that exacerbate economic inequality and makes 
some suggestions for a long-lasting, progressive legal reform movement. 
 
A.  Explanations 
 
Economic inequality results from a political process that is distorted by 
corporations and the wealthy due to the influence of money in politics. However, 
Supreme Court Justices are not supposed to be subject to the seductive influence of 
                                                     
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1. While Congress could enact a new coverage 
formula under Section 4, it is unlikely to do so given the current state of political 
partisanship. 
426 BARTELS, supra note 24, at 282. 
427 Id. 
428 See Mike Sacks & Ariel Edwards-Levy, Occupy the Courts Clashes With Supreme 
Court Police in Citizens United Protest, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:19 PM), http:/ 
/www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/20/occupy-the-courts-supreme-court-police-citizens-un 
ited_n_1219968.html. 
429 Id.  
430  Tony Mauro, “Occupy the Courts” Protests Hit Supreme Court and Federal 
Courthouses Nationwide, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (January 20, 2012, 5:05 PM), http:// 
legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/01/occupy-the-courts-protests-hit-supreme-court-and-fede 
ral-courthouses-nationwide-.html. 
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money. The Justices do not campaign for office, and business interests cannot 
lobby them. They have entirely different incentives than political leaders because 
they are appointed and have life tenure and, thus, do not have to fill campaign 
coffers to maintain their jobs. They have nowhere higher to go professionally. 
Moreover, they are insulated from the hurly-burly of politics because they select 
the cases they will decide and cannot be reversed on constitutional questions.431 
Why, then, is there such a strong strain in Supreme Court jurisprudence in favor of 
the 1%? There are two major models of Supreme Court decision making that shed 
light on this question: the attitudinal model and the majoritarian model. 
 
1.  The Attitudinal Model 
 
Under the attitudinal model, Supreme Court Justices vote their policy 
preferences because they can.432 In other words, Justice Scalia votes the way he 
does because he is conservative; Justice Breyer votes the way he does because he 
is liberal. 433  Political scientists have generated significant empirical evidence 
showing that the ideological preferences of the Justices are predictive of their votes 
in up to three-quarters of cases.434 The attitudinal model reflects the insights of 
legal realism in rebuking the traditional legal model, 435  under which judges 
neutrally discern the meaning of law through formal tools. Justices themselves 
claim fealty to the legal model,436 and to be sure, Justices sometimes vote contrary 
to expectations. Many decisions are unanimous, suggesting that the Justices “share 
legal values that can supersede policy preferences.” 437 Even proponents of the 
attitudinal model recognize that other factors are at work in Supreme Court 
decision making, such as precedent and modes of interpretation.438 Nevertheless, 
the attitudinal model is highly predictive and usually prevails when law is 
indeterminate,439 which is often the case in highly salient issues that come before 
                                                     
431  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
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the Supreme Court.440 Along with their publicly professed ideologies, the Justices’ 
attitudes can also reflect subconscious biases in favor of elites and against the 
poor.441  
The attitudinal model foretells that a right-leaning Court will issue 
conservative decisions. President Nixon made several conservative appointments 
to the Court beginning in 1969, halting the liberal gains of the Warren Court, and 
President Reagan subsequently “solidified a conservative majority on the Court” 
with his appointments.442 Since the rise of economic inequality began in the 1970s, 
there have been eleven appointments to the Supreme Court. Four were liberals 
appointed by Democratic presidents (Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
Kagan), six were conservatives appointed by Republican presidents (Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito), and one was a Republican 
appointee who turned out to be liberal (Justice Souter). Conservative Justices have 
predominated during the bulk of the time period in which economic inequality has 
increased. This is no accident. Conservative Republicans opposed to big 
government and dedicated to protecting the wealthy successfully launched a 
disciplined strategy to get conservative judges appointed throughout the 
judiciary.443  
Currently, there are four liberal Justices, four conservative Justices, and a 
swing Justice whose vote is often determinative in close cases (Justice Kennedy). 
Since 2005, Justice Kennedy has sided twice as often with the conservative wing 
than the liberal wing in 5-4 decisions.444 Given this 5–4 line-up, the attitudinal 
model may well explain the Court’s conservatism. The four most conservative 
Justices share a meritocratic conception of American society that is class blind and 
colorblind. They also view the private market as descriptively and normatively 
separate from government. Given these underlying ideological commitments, the 
Court has rejected legislative efforts to regulate market excesses, to restrain the 
influence of money in campaigns, and to diversify schools, while upholding 
                                                     
440 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 431, at 86, 92–93; Pickerill, supra note 163, at 
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Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1203–04 (2011) (evaluating 
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444 Amanda Cox & Matthew Ericson, Siding With the Liberal Wing, N.Y. TIMES, June 
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legislation that draws lines between and among the poor. At the same time, the 
Court upholds private market outcomes, such as corporate cultures and practices 
that disadvantage employees and consumers. The attitudinal model suggests that 
the Court’s policy preferences will not change unless the composition of the Court 
changes or individual Justices evolve in their policy preferences.  
 
2.  The Public-Opinion Model 
 
The second model stresses the majoritarian role of the Court, arguing that the 
Justices vote in accord with public opinion in order to preserve their legitimacy.445 
This model responds to the countermajoritarian difficulty posed by Professor 
Alexander Bickel; that is, why courts, which are not accountable politically, should 
have the final say in striking down popularly enacted laws.446 If courts reflect 
popular will, this moral problem with judicial review disappears. Professor Barry 
Friedman is a prominent proponent of the majoritarian view, asserting that 
“judicial decisions fall within the range of acceptability,”447 at least over time.448 
Indeed, a comparison of Court votes and public opinion polls confirms an 
association between the Court’s decisions and public mood. 449 This correlation 
could result simply from the fact that the Justices are subject to the same cultural 
stimuli as the rest of the citizenry, 450  or alternatively, the Justices may be 
constrained by public opinion because they want to ensure their decisions are 
enforced and survive attacks by the other branches.451  
Does the majoritarian model mean that the public supports a Supreme Court 
for the 1%? On the one hand, the public has long overestimated the extent of social 
mobility in America. One poll showed that 69% of Americans believe that 
“[p]eople are rewarded for intelligence and skills;” even in the heart of the 
recession, a poll found that 39% believed that it was common for people to start 
out poor and end up rich.452 In this regard, there are divisions along party lines. 
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Republicans are twice as likely to believe that everyone in American society has an 
opportunity to succeed, while Independents and Democrats are three and four 
times more likely to say that only some people have the opportunity to exceed.453  
On the other hand, there is growing awareness, partly culminating in and 
resulting from the Occupy Wall Street movement, that the wealthy have 
advantages over other Americans.454 In November 2011, during the height of the 
Occupy movement, a Wall Street Journal poll found that 76% agreed (with 60% 
strongly agreeing) that “the nation’s economic structure of the country is out of 
balance and favors a very small proportion of the rich over the rest of the 
country.”455 In April 2012, 62% thought it was important that “the government 
introduce policies to reduce inequality in the U.S.,” with 34% stating that this was 
very important. 456 Another survey asked respondents to select a diagram showing 
an ideal distribution of wealth, and they overwhelmingly selected a wealth 
distribution chart that reflected Sweden rather than the United States.457 In sum, 
“Americans are both philosophically conservative and operationally liberal.”458 In 
other words, “[t]hey believe in individual responsibility, free enterprise, and the 
American Dream,” but also “accept that government help may be needed to 
address concrete barriers to pursuing opportunity.”459 Public opinion thus suggests 
that most Americans would disapprove of Supreme Court decisions that foster 
inequality—if they were aware of the decisions and how they are connected to 
inequality. 
However, the range of decisions discussed in this Article stretch over a wide 
array of substantive issues, not all of which are obviously linked to economic 
inequality. Most of these decisions are not about inequality on their face; rather, 
they contribute to inequality. Further, the bulk of Supreme Court decisions fly 
under the radar screen of public scrutiny, further attenuating the constraint of 
public opinion on the Court. In studies of specific issues that impact inequality, the 
Court is sometimes aligned with public opinion, such as with affirmative action in 
higher education (the public generally supports soft preferences for diversity and 
rejects quotas),460 and sometimes out of alignment, such as with public school 
                                                     
453 See BARTELS, supra note 24, at 150.  
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ST. J., Nov. 8, 2011, at A6. 
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integration (which the public generally supports)461 and campaign finance reform 
(which the public also supports). 462  Yet, even when the Court issues wildly 
unpopular decisions, such as Bush v. Gore and Citizens United, it retains the 
support of the public as an institution.463 Its diffuse support is quite strong.  
What are the implications of this support? In the aftermath of the Court’s 
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius464 to uphold 
the individual health care mandate in the Affordable Care Act, news reports 
speculated that Justice Roberts switched his vote in order to win public support and 
enhance the legitimacy of the Court. 465  On the one hand, this case may 
demonstrate the majoritarian model in action. On the other hand, Justice Roberts 
may simply have been articulating his own view of judicial restraint without regard 
to popular opinion, and indeed, popular opinion was quite split on the advisability 
of the individual health care mandate.  
Along these lines, Professor Richard Pildes argues that the majoritarian model 
overstates the constraints on the Court, given that the political branches rarely 
confront the Court, particularly in highly polarized periods in which a Court 
majority can garner the support of enough lawmakers to protect itself.466 As a 
result, “[t]he modern Court has considerably more latitude to depart from 
‘majoritarian preferences,’ however defined, and the Court knows it.”467 If the 
majoritarian model is accurate, it implies that public opinion on inequality may 
influence the Court, but only if the public and the Court understand and accept the 
complex connection between law and economic inequality. Even if the 
majoritarian model overstates its case, no one—including the Justices 
themselves468—denies that the Court is aware of public opinion and that it can 
sometimes shape Supreme Court decision making. In turn, this suggests that a 
movement such as Occupy Wall Street can have an impact on the Court, but only 
to the extent that a Justice’s attitudinal preferences are open to persuasion. In the 
end, attitude and public opinion can be mutually reinforcing and both appear to 
play a role in Supreme Court decision making. 
 
 
 
                                                     
461  Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 460, at 18, 18–39. 
462 Manoj Mate & Matthew Wright, The 2000 Presidential Election Controversy, in 
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 460, at 333, 347–48. 
463 FRIEDMAN, supra note 448, at 15. 
464 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
465 See, e.g., Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS 
NEWS, (July 1, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/rober 
ts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
466 Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 103, 147–48 (2010). 
467 Id. at 148. 
468 FRIEDMAN, supra note 448, at 371. 
450 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
B.  Solutions 
 
In July 2012 economists Jacob Hacker and Nate Loewentheil released a 
manifesto, full of detailed suggestions for reducing economic inequality,469 which 
was supported by groups, including the AFL-CIO, Center for Community Change, 
Economic Policy Institute, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 
National Council of La Raza and SEIU. The report’s recommendations are 
organized around the principles of growth, security, and democracy, and its ideas 
are specific and wide ranging, including spurring job growth through infrastructure 
improvements, guaranteeing college for all, expanding rights to collective 
bargaining, and limiting corporate lobbying. 470  Indeed, there is no shortage of 
detailed, carefully considered suggestions for reform from these and other experts. 
After examining the economic literature on inequality, journalist Timothy Noah 
recommends a progressive tax system, expanding the federal payroll, importing 
skilled labor, universalizing preschool, controlling the prices of higher education, 
regulating Wall Street, electing Democratic presidents, and reviving the labor 
movement. 471  Stiglitz envisions a similar reform agenda that would increase 
economic efficiency, fairness, and opportunity by curbing excesses at the top with 
some redistribution towards the 99%.472 Professor David Brady calls for tested 
policies that have proven to work in other affluent democracies.473 In general, these 
proposals do not address the Supreme Court, other than to call for an overruling of 
Citizens United. Yet, as this Article demonstrates, Citizens United is just one piece 
of a much larger problem.  
We currently have a Court majority that is not only unsympathetic to 
inequality arguments, but also seemingly oblivious to (or skeptical of) the 
connection between government policies and market outcomes. The Court has 
ruled that it is up to the legislative branch, rather than the Courts, to remedy 
economic inequality. Yet, the Court has doomed legislative enactments that would 
ameliorate inequality, such as desegregation plans, campaign finance reforms, and 
consumer protection laws. Conversely, when legislatures enact policies that tend to 
worsen economic inequality or magnify its effects, the Court defers, such as school 
financing laws and voter identification requirements. In short, the Court’s rulings 
consistently sustain policies that create or maintain economic inequality. 
Nevertheless, and in the spirit of the OWS movement, progressive lawyers can 
develop strategies for expanding social justice, using the tools that lawyers can 
bring to the table. After all, the Court’s membership will change with new 
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appointments, and the Justices’ attitudes can evolve over time—just as public 
opinion does.  
Thus, this Article makes five suggestions for the economic justice lawyering 
movement. First, we need to continue to develop theoretical and doctrinal 
frameworks centered on economic fairness. Second, we need to engage with other 
disciplines in building a social science record that reveals the connection between 
law, policy, and economic hardship. Third, progressive lawyering movements need 
to recognize the role of class in racial and gender disparities and to advance a 
robust economic justice movement that benefits the entire 99%. Fourth, we need 
multidisciplinary strategies for fighting economic injustice that expand beyond 
litigation and courts to ensure rights. Finally, we need to expand access to justice 
in order to ensure that the judicial system is responsive to the 99%.  
 
1.  A Legal Philosophy of Equality 
 
To begin with, progressive lawyers need to continue the work of Professor 
Frank Michelman and other scholars to develop legal theories that promote and 
sustain economic justice for the 99%. In the 1970s, as the Court appeared poised to 
enforce social and economic rights, Michelman reflected upon the political 
philosophy of John Rawls and advocated for a baseline minimum of social and 
economic rights in lieu of equality, as the Court is better suited to articulate the 
former than the latter.474 Professor William Forbath extended Michelman’s theory 
and argued that a baseline minimum should include not only welfare, but also a 
right to dignified work in order to ensure social citizenship for all.475 He asserts 
that welfare alone cannot ensure political equality or “undo the stigma of 
permanent exclusion from a shared destiny of work and opportunity.”476 Using a 
more communitarian framework, Professor Goodwin Liu veers away from 
Rawlsian notions of justice to endorse political philosopher Michael Walzer’s 
thoery of “shared understandings.”477 In Walzer’s approach, society arrives at a 
consensus about essential welfare goods through its “institutions, laws, and 
practices.” 478  Liu acknowledges that under this approach, law follows politics, 
which in turn suggests a focus on the political branches to effectuate change.479 As 
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an example, Liu suggests that society has arrived at a shared commitment to equal 
educational opportunities, which in turn, supports a legal claim to equal federal 
educational financing between states.480  
In another theoretical stance, several prominent constitutional law professors 
have turned the conservative commitment to originalism on its head by explaining 
how the original meaning of the Constitution is consistent with liberal, progressive 
positions. 481  Alternatively, Professor Helen Hershkoff argues that state consti-
tutions, which often provide express social and economic rights, are more viable 
mechanisms for protecting the poor than the federal Constitution.482 While these 
various approaches differ, they share a belief in the constitutional viability of rights 
claims for the poor, and thus, give hope that social movements toward economic 
justice can shape constitutional interpretation in the future. Giving up on 
constitutional claims for economic justice can become a self-fulfilling prophecy,483 
as can ceding legitimacy to conservative interpretations of the constitution.484 One 
need only look at the Court’s reversal of its views with regard to the 
criminalization of homosexual conduct to know that theory needs to be ready and 
waiting when the Court catches up to societal norms.  
 
2.  The Facts of Economic Inequality 
 
Theory alone is not enough. Courts need to see a factual record that reveals 
the connections between government policies and economic inequality and 
debunks the idea that the market always produces fair outcomes. They need to be 
educated about the real world consequences of the decisions they make.485 Many 
of the books cited in this Article, written by renowned economists, political 
scientists, and journalists, make this case through careful empirical analysis. Thus, 
interdisciplinary explanations regarding economic inequality are available for 
lawyers to present to courts. Further, social scientists have established that one’s 
economic status is not determined solely by behavior, as the majority of Justices 
seem to assume, but rather, that structural economic factors are at play.486 This 
challenges the Justices’ ingrained notions of deservedness. 
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In the United States, poverty is seen as a personal failing.487 In this dominant 
“culture of poverty” perspective, poverty is tied to individual behavior.488 This 
viewpoint is consistent with our American myth of meritocracy, which holds that 
with hard work and sheer grit, anyone can pull themselves up by their 
bootstraps.489 Conversely, a failure to thrive in our capitalist marketplace is a moral 
failure.490 If poverty is a choice, then the rest of society has “a justification for 
doing so little,” and we are off the hook for assisting the poor.491 An alternate 
narrative focuses on how structural forces within our economy and society cause 
poverty.492 In this perspective, the poor are trapped in the underclass due to forces 
outside their control that limit their economic opportunities and social mobility.493 
For instance, trends discussed previously in this Article, such as globalization, the 
weakening of unions, and economic shifts from a manufacturing base to a service 
economy, have left behind people without college degrees. 494  Likewise, even 
working adults can remain trapped below the poverty line if they do not have a 
living wage, affordable housing, or child-care.495 Some people of color remain 
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excluded from the mainstream economy as a result of a legacy of race 
discrimination in housing and the workplace, as well as the criminal justice 
system.496 These structural forces undermine the meritocracy myth. 
While debates have raged between the behaviorist and structuralist 
explanations for poverty, sociologist William Julius Wilson instead explains how 
behavioral and structural factors intersect. 497 His work focuses on low-income, 
urban, African-American communities, and he has shown how people who grow 
up in racially segregated, poor neighborhoods develop coping mechanisms and 
responses that “emerge from patterns of racial exclusion” and end up limiting 
social mobility.498 Accordingly, Wilson concludes that “structural factors are likely 
to play a far greater role than cultural factors in bringing about rapid neighborhood 
change. As he points out, a strong economy lessens poverty (and its associated 
pathologies), while a weak economy increases poverty. If culture were 
determinative, then increased economic opportunity would not have a 
transformative impact in poor communities. 499  In short, structural forces drive 
behavioral responses, and the resultant behavior “often reinforces the very 
conditions that have emerged from structural inequities.”500 Most judges do not 
come to the bench with these sophisticated understandings about poverty; thus, this 
is an area where cross-disciplinary explanations and evidence may make a 
difference to legal advocacy. 
 
3.  Coalitions for Economic Justice 
 
Historically, unions have been the main advocacy group for issues related to 
economic equality. Yet, unions have been criticized for representing the interests 
of white, male workers, rather than of women and minorities.501 Moreover, labor 
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DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDER CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1987). 
498 Gilman, supra note 486, at 542 (quoting WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN 
JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY 43 (2009)); see also WILSON, 
supra note 497, at 134.  
499 Gilman, supra note 486, at 542; see also MASSEY, supra note 494, at 57 (citing 
PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 
145 (1997)). 
500 Gilman, supra note 486, at 542 (quoting MASSEY, supra note 494, at 133–34).  
501 See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 
1782, 1796–1800, 1823–34 (2001) (providing a detailed, historically based explanation of 
how “organized labor, and the working class more generally, came to be associated with a 
conservative defense of the status quo and white male privilege”); Scott L. Cummings & 
Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 488 
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law as implemented by legislatures and interpreted by courts has encouraged “a 
divide between unionism and social justice movements” by narrowing the labor 
agenda and focusing on particular constituencies. 502  Conversely, identity-based 
movements based on race and gender have tended to focus on civil rights rather 
than economic issues, 503  and within these movements, some voices have been 
marginalized. 504  Furthermore, progressive lawyering has splintered into highly 
specialized focus areas (such as immigration law, homelessness, domestic violence, 
and the like) that provide targeted representation to clients, but limit cross-
collaboration.505 In light of these tensions, both real and perceived, a movement for 
economic equality will be more effective if it brings together these movements and 
issues, along with the energy, wisdom, and experience these divergent strands can 
bring together.506 For instance, in recent years unions and civil rights groups have 
recognized “common interests in order to further their shared goals,”507 and unions 
have played a role in improving communities of color.508 
In this spirit, social justice advocates need to recognize the intersectional 
impacts of class, race, gender, and other identities on economic welfare. 509 
                                                     
(2001) (“The labor organizing movement, which has focused on creating class solidarity 
among the working poor, also has a history of ignoring identity-based interests.”). Cf. 
Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, “So Closely Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 
81 G.W. L. REV. 1135 (2013) (arguing that while this may have been true historically, 
today civil rights groups and unions often work collaboratively and share the same 
interests). 
502 See Crain & Matheny, supra note 501, at 1792. 
503 See id. at 1784 (“Just as race and gender have proved to be divisive forces within 
the labor movement, however, class differences similarly have divided the antiracist and 
feminist movements.”). 
504  Cummings & Eagly, supra note 501, at 488–89 (“Similarly, the civil rights 
movement, another precursor of modern organizing practice, has often been criticized for 
its patriarchal structure and its marginalization of black women’s issues.”).  
505  See Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to 
Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 234 (2000) 
(“Among reformers generally, Balkanization—or at least a fairly fine division of political 
labor by issues and groups—is seemingly universal. Advocates tend to specialize: on race 
discrimination and affirmative action, gender equity, low wage work, welfare reform, child 
care, housing, education, trade globalization, and so on.”).  
506 See, e.g., Sheryll Cashin, Shall We Overcome? “Post-Racialism” and Inclusion in 
the 21st Century, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 31, 45–46 (2011) (describing the 
effectiveness of the Gamaliel Foundation, which has helped form multifaith, “multiracial, 
multi-class coalitions” that advocate on behalf of progressive public policy reforms). 
Cashin writes, “[t]he people, movements, or political parties that prevail in the twenty-first 
century will have spoken to a broad range of people.” Id. at 47. 
507 Garden & Leong, supra note 501, at 48. 
508 Id. at 73–80. 
509 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness: Individual Identity, 
Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1470 (2002) (“[I]dentity is 
multidimensional: The various identity categories interact to shape our individual and 
collective identities and experiences.”). 
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Professor Mari Matsuda proposes a way to “understand the interconnection of all 
forms of subordination” by asking “the other question.”510 As she states: 
 
When I see something that looks racist, I ask, “Where is the 
patriarchy in this?” When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, 
“Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that looks 
homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in this?” Working in 
coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious 
relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of 
subordination ever stands alone.511  
 
In addition to asking “the other question,” we need a sophisticated 
understanding of class,512 which provides less of a personal identity or basis for 
group solidarity in the United States than other shared aspects of identity, such as 
race or gender or sexual orientation.513 As Professor Trina Jones explains, class 
stereotypes and beliefs are “dynamic and fluid” and not easy to define, as class 
emerges from “[w]ealth, educational background, occupational skill and status, 
consumption patterns and practices, and residential location, among other 
things.” 514  Professor Deborah Malamud similarly observes, “[t]he factors 
contributing to relative economic advantage exist in a delicate balance and interact 
in space and time, as is generally true of the elements of society and culture.”515 
Moreover, in this country the vast majority of people identify as middle class, even 
if they are economically at the far ends of the spectrum, making it hard to organize 
on the basis of shared economic status.  
At the same time, the very nuance required to understand class and its 
relationship to race, gender, and other identities can make it hard to generate a 
movement.516 Perhaps for this reason, Occupy Wall Street identified a 99% with a 
                                                     
510  Mari Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of 
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189–90 (1991). 
511 Id.; see also Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday 
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (unpacking how the 
welfare system responds to multiple oppressions of class, race, and gender). 
512 On various conceptions of “class,” see Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, 
Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s in a Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 
807, 808–10 (2011). 
513 See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and 
Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1886–87 (explaining why college students do not form 
identity groups based on class). 
514 Trina Jones, Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an Increasingly Complex 
Tapestry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); see also Malamud, supra note 513, at 
1866–94 (discussing the difficulty of defining class).  
515 Malamud, supra note 513, at 1889. 
516 There is a vigorous debate within political philosophy as to whether identity based 
politics obscure the importance of the political economy. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 50–53 (2003) (describing the 
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shared interest in greater distribution of resources, without emphasizing the 
immense variances between and among the 99%. For instance, a professional in 
the top 10% has a far different life experience than an individual who is homeless 
because he recently lost his job. Not surprisingly then, Occupy Wall Street did not 
generate its own political movement; its base of support was extremely diffuse. A 
social-justice movement dedicated to legal change needs to mobilize multiple 
constituencies, while recognizing shared interests and marked differences.517 
 
4.  Multidimensional Strategies 
 
As lawyers in both progressive and conservative social-change movements 
know well, litigation is not the only way to reform law or even the best way. 
Rather, there are multiple tools for effectuating systemic change, including 
community organizing, 518  legislative and administrative advocacy, civil dis-
obedience, public education,519 and community education.520 Indeed, the Occupy 
Wall Street movement combined elements of organizing, protest, media attention, 
and social-media activism. While it did not attempt to change law directly, Occupy 
Wall Street altered public and political dialogue, and probably helped lay the 
groundwork for the fiscal cliff deal reached by President Obama and Congress in 
early 2013, a central piece of which was higher taxes for top earners. Notably, 
Occupy Wall Street was not a rights-based movement; it focused on a societal 
critique rather than affirmative claims. 
Lawyers who advocate for social reform disagree over the utility of rights-
based strategies. On the one hand, the major social-justice movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s, such as the fight for civil rights and gender equality, were focused on 
attaining rights for subordinated people and relied on the persuasive power of 
rights-based discourse and the legal power of rights-based claims. As Professor 
                                                     
debates between Iris Marion Young, who defends identity-based politics, and Nancy Fraser, 
who argues for a greater focus on material deprivations). 
517 See Crain & Matheny, supra note 501, at 1825 (making this recommendation for 
the labor movement). 
518 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 501, at 460–61 (the community organizing 
movement “has focused on fostering grassroots participation in local decision making, 
coordinating the strategic deployment of community resources to achieve community-
defined goals, and building community-based democratic organizations led by local leaders 
who advocate for social and economic change”).  
519 Professor Gary Blasi argues that advocates who serve the homeless effectively 
educated the public about the causes of homelessness, such that the public now accepts that 
homelessness is rooted in structural, rather than individual, causes. Gary Blasi, Advocacy 
and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness, 
19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 220–22, 234 (2000).  
520 Community legal education is “a form of systemic advocacy that aims to educate a 
segment of the community about its rights in a particular legal context to advance the 
empowerment of that community.” Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching Social Justice 
Lawyering: Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 
18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 404 (2012).  
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Martha Minow has stated, rights rhetoric “enables a devastating, if rhetorical, 
exposure of and challenge to hierarchies of power.”521 On the other hand, rights 
have been critiqued for failing to achieve transformative change in political and 
social structures and for individualizing and masking collective forms of 
oppression.522 Professor Marc Tushnet contends that “social circumstances,” rather 
than court-based rules, actually change outcomes. 523  Moreover, people who 
already hold power in society sometimes co-opt newly recognized rights.524  
This dichotomy is mirrored in the debates over whether litigation or other 
forms of advocacy can better achieve social justice.525 Litigation is credited for 
changing “many aspects of the social, political, and economic landscape,”526 such 
as the decision in Roe v. Wade,527 establishing a right to abortions, or the decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, striking down separate but equal schools. 528 
                                                     
521 Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 
1860, 1910 (1987); see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal 
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305 (1987) 
(“Rights do, at times, give pause to those who would otherwise oppress us; without the 
law’s sanction, these individuals would be more likely to express racist sentiments on the 
job. It is condescending and misguided to assume that the enervating effect of rights talk is 
experienced by the victims and not the perpetrators of racial mistreatment.” (footnote 
omitted)); Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern 
Civil Rights Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 377 (2000) (stating rights 
“can mobilize people by casting grievances as legitimate entitlements and by fostering a 
sense of collective identity”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 598 (1986) (stating 
rights discourse “can help to affirm human values, enhance political growth, and assist in 
the development of collective identity”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430 
(1987) (describing how black Americans “nurtured rights and gave rights life”). 
522 See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 595–96 (1985); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from 
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 757 (1988) (noting the “oft-
observed risk that litigation will co-opt social mobilization”); see also Schneider, supra 
note 521, at 593–99 (summarizing the critical legal studies critique of rights). 
523 Marc Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 32–33 (1993).  
524 See Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1752 (2000) (“[T]his progressive civil rights legacy has 
been undermined by conservative political backlash and rhetorical appropriation of rights 
language and its moral claims.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-
Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1352–54 
(2000). 
525 While there are many conceptions of social justice, Iris Marion Young helpfully 
defines it as “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression.” IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 15 (1990). 
526 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 501, at 491. 
527 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
528 See Nan D. Hunter, Response, Lawyering for Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1009, 1013 (1997). Cf. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law 
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Sometimes, creative litigation can be used to unmask existing power structures,529 
and even when litigation fails, it can still reshape public dialogue and opinion and 
generate leverage for alternate solutions.530 Yet, litigation can also breed a sense of 
powerlessness in ordinary people, as it is a world dominated by privileged 
experts.531 Litigation does not help people “gain control of the forces which affect 
their lives,”532 as it forces people to voice their aspirations in terms cognizable by 
courts.533 This critique has led to new forms of community-based lawyering in 
which “[a]ttorneys appear as supporting players rather than main characters, 
seeking to help organizations build the power needed to achieve their goals.”534 In 
this capacity, a lawyer can hold many roles—“litigator and litigation analyst, 
transactional lawyer, political strategist, negotiator, community educator, broker, 
writer, lobbyist, and staff member.”535 As part of this nonhierarchical relationship, 
clients “are transformed through the process of struggle by learning about, and 
participating in, a decision that will fundamentally affect their quality of life.”536  
Suffice to say, in developing strategies for obtaining economic equality, there 
is space for all these models and strategies. Just as the causes of economic equality 
are complex, strategies to achieve equality need to be equally multifaceted and 
                                                     
to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 991 (1997) (arguing that legislative reform 
can be more “culture shifting” than judicial reform). 
529 Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal 
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 375–76 (1983) 
(“[T]he lawyer should always attempt to reshape the way legal conflicts are represented in 
the law, revealing the limiting character of legal ideology and bringing out the true 
socioeconomic and political foundations of legal disputes.”).  
530 See Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, 
Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133, 2141 (2007) (“These lawyers measure the 
success of their work in relation to how much power the groups develop and how much 
closer it brings them to achieving their vision.”); White, supra note 522, at 758–59 (In 
some situations, litigation “widens the public imagination about right and wrong, mobilizes 
political action behind new social arrangements, or pressures those in power to make 
concessions.”).  
531 See Steve Bachmann, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 391, 391–92 (1992) (book review).  
532  William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for 
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 455–56 (1995).  
533 See Virginia P. Coto, LUCHA, The Struggle for Life: Legal Services for Battered 
Immigrant Women, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749, 753 (1999) (“The lawyer for poor 
individuals is likely, whether he wins cases or not, to leave his clients precisely where he 
found them, except that they will have developed a dependency on his skills to smooth out 
the roughest spots in their lives.”); White, supra note 522, at 757. 
534 Gordon, supra note 530, at 2133; White, supra note 522, at 764 (“The role of the 
lawyer is to help the group learn a method of deliberation that will lead to effective and 
responsible strategic action.”). 
535 Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2057–58 (2007).  
536 LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 14–15 (2001). 
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ongoing. For instance, the foreclosure crisis—a key ingredient of the Great 
Recession and a focus of Occupy Wall Street protests—had many causes, requiring 
multiple responses. Roots of the crisis included a rise in subprime and predatory 
lending fueled by low interest rates; risk taking behavior by lenders and borrowers; 
lender fraud; a burst in the housing market bubble that led to the rapid devaluation 
of housing prices; an economic downturn that lead to financial hardship and 
inability by some homeowners to pay mortgages; a lack of regulatory oversight of 
the mortgage market and ratings agencies; and the collapse of the asset-backed 
securitized mortgage market.537 Notably, the foreclosure crisis was fueled by and 
magnified income inequality.538 Social justice advocates have responded to this 
crisis with a wide variety of tactics in the hopes of helping homeowners and 
tenants remain in their homes. Lawyers have worked with community groups to 
educate homeowners about their rights. 539  Lawyers have filed class actions 
challenging a wide array of discriminatory, unfair, and misleading lending 
practices.540 Lawyers have represented individuals in court and in new forums of 
alternative dispute resolution.541 Lawyers have provided federal policymakers with 
recommendations based on their on-the-ground perspectives. 542  Lawyers have 
moved legislatures to enact new protections and processes to govern the 
foreclosure process.543 While litigation has been a piece of the response to the 
                                                     
537 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT 
CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS vii–xi (2010), available at http://www.huduser.org/P 
ublications/PDF/Foreclosure_09.pdf (summarizing the literature on the crisis).  
538 Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Conduct, 
and the Financial Crisis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641, 643 (2011) (arguing that 
income and racial inequality created social distance that lead to predatory conduct). Brescia 
notes that the greater the income inequality in a state, the greater the rate of mortgage 
delinquencies. Id. at 644. 
539 See Nicholas Hartigan, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response to 
the Foreclosure Crisis in Massachusetts, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181, 197–99 (2010) 
(describing how lawyers and community groups came together to canvass every home 
facing foreclosure to educate homeowners about their rights). 
540 See Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in 
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2009) (describing various 
forms of litigation against lenders for misconduct); see generally Gary Klein & Shennan 
Kavanagh, Causes of the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis and the Availability of Class Action 
Responses, 2 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 137 (2010) (discussing recent class actions). 
541 See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a 
Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1908–15 (2013) (discussing the 
increased use of procedures for alternative dispute resolution to mitigate the harms of the 
foreclosure crisis); see generally Janet Stidman Eveleth, Foreclosure Crisis: Volunteer 
Lawyers Help Homeowners, 42 MD. BAR J. 50 (2009) (describing a pro bono project in 
Maryland to help those affected by the foreclosure crisis). 
542  Robin S. Golden, Building Policy Through Collaborative Deliberation: A 
Reflection on Using Lessons from Practice to Inform Responses to the Mortgage 
Foreclosure Crisis, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 733, 737 (2011). 
543 See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure 
Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 371–83 (2012); 
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foreclosure crisis, it has only been one part of a broad-based movement to preserve 
housing. Likewise, other areas of economic inequality will require similarly broad-
based, creative, and coordinated approaches. 
 
5.  Access to Justice  
 
Of course, the Supreme Court is not the entire story of how law reinforces 
inequality. The judicial branch encompasses federal, state, and administrative 
courts, and these fora have much greater day-to-day contact with the 99%. Indeed, 
most Americans have contact with the judicial branch through lower-level district 
courts when they owe a debt, are part of a dissolving family, or are accused of 
committing a crime. Yet, there is no right to civil legal counsel, and as a result, 
“the market controls the distribution, availability, and quality of legal services.”544 
The market outcome is grim. Fewer than one in five low-income people have 
access to a lawyer for their civil legal problems,545 while only two to three-fifths of 
middle-income Americans can afford civil legal help.546 Fewer than 1% of the 
nation’s total legal expenditures go to the bottom seventh of Americans who 
qualify for legal aid,547 and thus, poor litigants are left to fend for themselves pro 
se. Moreover, the fora where these low-income citizens often appear have none of 
the trappings of the Supreme Court. On the one hand, harried judges may be 
presiding over hundreds of cases in a single day; on the other hand, administrative 
law judges may take months to process even basic claims for benefits.548 With 
regard to criminal justice systems, the vast majority of criminal defendants are 
indigent.549 While they have a formal right to counsel, this right is illusory given 
that 90% of defendants plead out with no factual investigation on their case, 
largely because public defenders are grossly overworked and underpaid.550  
This lack of equal access to justice compounds economic inequality for those 
who cannot afford lawyers, experts, and other accoutrement of modern day 
                                                     
The Foreclosure Crisis and Its Impact on Tenants, NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT, http://nhl 
p.org/foreclosureandtenants/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (describing new federal and state 
laws designed to protect tenants who live in homes going through foreclosure). 
544 Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 100 (2005). 
545  LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_ 
2009.pdf. 
546 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004). 
547 Id. at 7; Rubinson, supra note 544, at 103. 
548 See Rubinson, supra note 544, at 109–16 (describing the staggering caseloads of 
judges and administrative law judges). 
549  RHODE, supra note 546, at 11 (“In criminal cases, over three-quarters of 
defendants facing felony charges are poor enough to qualify for court-appointed counsel.”). 
550 See id. at 4 (“Fewer than 1[%] of lawyers are in legal aid practice, which works out 
to about one lawyer for every 1,400 poor or near-poor persons in the United States.”); 
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1126 (2006). 
462 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
litigation. As Professor Deborah Rhode says, “[w]e tolerate a system in which 
money often matters more than merit, and equal protection principles are routinely 
subverted in practice.” 551  Thus, any progressive movement aimed at reducing 
income inequality needs to consider reforms of the entire judicial system and to 
strategize around ways to give voice and fair process to the 99%. Professor Robert 
Rubinson identifies proposals that work within existing frameworks, such as 
expansions of pro bono programs, enhanced government spending on legal 
representation for the poor, and a right to counsel in civil cases.552 Further, he 
suggests reforms that are more transformative and that break the reliance on 
lawyers to achieve justice, such as evolving models of alternative dispute 
resolution and community lawyering, in which lawyers help communities reach 
their self-defined goals through organizing, lobbying, and transactional law. 553 
These multidimensional approaches may not only hold greater promise for 
expanding access to justice, but also for achieving justice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Occupy Wall Street protests in 2011 focused public attention on 
economic inequality, as well as the role of government policies in contributing to 
economic inequality. The invisible or impartial hand of the marketplace does not 
cause economic inequality. Rather, the marketplace exists and operates within a 
framework established by government. President Obama amplified the themes of 
Occupy Wall Street, calling economic equality the “defining issue of our time,” in 
his 2012 State of the Union Address.554 In line with this theme, Obama supported 
the 2009 stimulus legislation, health care coverage for the uninsured in the 
Affordable Care Act, and he repeatedly called on the 1% to pay their share of the 
nation’s tax bill. 555  After winning re-election, in 2013 his State of the Union 
featured several additional proposals to reduce economic inequality, such as a rise 
in the minimum wage and universal preschool. In his 2014 State of the Union, 
President Obama again addressed inequality, which “has deepened,” and he 
accordingly pushed ideas such as stricter enforcement of equal pay laws for 
women, an expansion of unemployment insurance, and a higher minimum wage.556 
Laws and measures such as these recognize the role of government in both creating 
                                                     
551 RHODE, supra note 546, at 3. 
552 Rubinson, supra note 544, at 100 n.10, 139, 153–54. 
553 Id. at 139–44, 153; see supra notes 534–543 and accompanying text. 
554 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 
24, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-presi 
dent-state-union-address. 
555 Zachary A. Goldfarb, How Fighting Income Inequality Became Obama’s Driving 
Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-23/opinion 
s/35512079_1_income-inequality-fiscal-cliff-disposable-income. 
556 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 
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and ameliorating economic inequality. Nevertheless, the judicial branch is rarely 
part of the narrative of economic inequality, despite its significant impact.  
The Supreme Court reinforces economic inequality by selectively employing 
deference to legislative judgments. When legislatures act to level the playing field, 
the Court generally abandons deference, such as with voluntary desegregation 
plans, consumer protection and employment statutes, and campaign finance laws. 
By contrast, when legislatures pass laws that engender economic inequality, the 
Court is happy to defer, such as with school financing laws, voter identification 
requirements, and punitive social welfare policies. Either way, the 99% do not win. 
Thus, any social movement for economic equality needs to consider the impact of 
the judiciary and its potential for reforming law. Extreme levels of economic 
inequality harm our entire society. To succeed as a nation, we need laws and a 
judiciary that serves us all—the full 100%.  
